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GIVING DOMA SOME CREDIT: THE
VALIDITY OF APPLYING DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE ACTS TO CIVIL UNIONS UNDER
THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit
clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead
to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the
statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the
other, but cannot be in its own.'
Julie and Cassandra want to get married. 2 Upon arriving at the local
clerk's office, they discover that their home state of Georgia will not
legally recognize a same-sex marriage. However, after much
investigation, they learn that in Vermont they can enter into a civil
union,3 which offers similar but not precisely the same rights as a
heterosexual marriage. In light of this, they travel to Vermont and get a
civil union certified for the two of them. Upon return to their state of
residence, however, they learn that Georgia will not recognize the civil
union. Georgia bases this refusal upon a statute it has enacted, stating
that it prohibits the recognition of same-sex marriages.4 Consequently,
I Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (Stone, J.).
This issue has become one of current significant controversy. The author has last updated
all sources contained in this Note as of October 26, 2003, to reflect current trends and
political movement.
2 This is a hypothetical created entirely by the author and contains fictitious names and
events. It does, however, reflect the typical occurrence of same-sex couples going to
Vermont to get a civil union and the problems they face when they move elsewhere. See
Indiana Lesbian Couple Seek Divorce (Dec. 17, 2003), at http://www.365gay.com/
newscontent/121703indianadivorce.htm; Judge Amends Controversial Lesbian Divorce (Dec.
31, 2003), at http://www.365gay.com/newscontent/123103iowadivorce.htm.
3 A "civil union," currently established only in Vermont, is a legally recognized
relationship between individuals of the same gender. VT. STAT. ANN. it. 15, § 1202(2)
(2000). Since its recognition, civil unions have been entered into at a significant rate. Greg
Johnson, In Praise of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 315, 334 (2002). Beginning in 2000,
almost 2,500 civil unions have been recorded. Report of the Vermont Civil Union Review
Commission (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/cureport.htm.
Nearly two-thirds of those are between female couples, and the average age of all civil
union couples is forty-one. Id. Three-quarters of these unions involve persons from states
other than Vermont. Id. Same-sex couples have not come from the following states:
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming. Johnson, supra, at 334.
4 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2000). The statute states:
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Georgia will not grant full faith and credit to any other state's same-sex
marriage decrees.5 Julie and Cassandra also find out that Georgia passed
this statute with Congress' express permission.6 This permission is
found in a statute that allows states to determine that the application of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is optional with regard to same-sex
marriage. Angered by Georgia's hostility to their union, Julie and
Cassandra challenge both the state and federal statutes. First, they
criticize Congress' statute, contending that Congress cannot
constitutionally limit the Full Faith and Credit Clause.7 Further, they
argue that Georgia, who acted in response to Congress' statute, should
be required to honor the language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
(a) It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the
union only of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the
same sex are prohibited in this state.
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized
as entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by
persons of the same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by
another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this
state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of such license shall be
unenforceable in the courts of this state and the courts of this state
shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to
grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such marriage
or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights
arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage.
Id.
5 Id.
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
7 Arguments for recognition of civil unions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
("FFCC") may seem to fly in the face of the democratic process. Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v.
General Motors: Implications for lnter-Jurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 150 (1998) (stating that requiring states to recognize civil unions
and same-sex marriages under the FFCC "would be the most astonishingly undemocratic,
counter-majoritarian political development in American history" as American adults are
opposed to it by a margin of two to one and an overwhelming majority in both of the
houses of Congress, in conjunction with President Clinton (perhaps the President most
sympathetic to gay and lesbian concerns), passed DOMA). However, proponents of the
recognition of civil unions and same-sex marriage threaten to use the FFCC to impose on
other states the obligation to recognize these legal relationships. Lawrence Morahan, Civil
Rights, Legal Groups Voice Support of Same-Sex Marriage (Nov. 25, 2002), at
http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/Archive/ 200211/CUL20021125c.html.
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even when it does not serve Georgia's interest.8 Can Julie and Cassandra
win on these grounds? 9
Julie and Cassandra will not prevail with this legal argument.10 As a
preliminary issue, Congress' statute, officially recognized as the Defense
of Marriage Act ("DOMA")," explicitly permits states not to recognize
same-sex marriages entered into in another state.12 This federal DOMA
is mirrored in many states with what scholars label "mini-DOMAs," 13
which implement this permission by explicitly refusing to recognize
same-sex marriages.14 Congress enacted the federal DOMA under the
8 Such a refusal to recognize a civil union, regardless of its constitutionality, may seem
intolerant and narrow-minded. But see Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the
Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardinal O'Connor a "Homophobe"?, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 587 (1996).
9 Julie and Cassandra might win on other grounds, such as equal protection, due
process, or even free speech. See articles cited infra note 219. However, the analysis of such
issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
10 See infra Part III.A.2 for a detailed discussion of the constitutionality of Congress'
federal statute, and Part III.A.3 for a detailed discussion of the constitutionality of the
states' statutes.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). See infra Part II.C for further discussion of DOMA's passage
and current application.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. The Federal DOMA states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
Id.
13 See infra note 169 and accompanying text for examples of the three types of state
DOMAs enacted pursuant to the federal DOMA.
14 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (1975) (stating that "[tihe state of Alabama shall not
recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to
have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage
license was issued"); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013(a) (Michie Supp. 2000) (stating that "(a]
marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, either under common law or under
statute, that is recognized by another state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state, and
contractual rights granted by virtue of the marriage, including its termination, are
unenforceable in this state."). Similarly, Arkansas' DOMA states:
Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, where a
marriage license is issued by another state or by a foreign jurisdiction,
shall be void in Arkansas and any contractual or other rights granted
by virtue of that license, including its termination, shall be
unenforceable in the Arkansas courts.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(c) (Michie 1998). Thirty-seven states currently have such
statutes in place. Liberty Counsel, United States Laws Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriages,
available at http://www.c.org/ProFarnily/DOMAs.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2004).
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assumption that the Full Faith and Credit Clause ("FFCC") is applicable
only as Congress determines.'5 However, such an interpretation of the
FFCC is hotly debated. 16  Some scholars argue against Congress'
interpretation of the FFCC, stating that the role of Congress is a
procedural one. Congress' role is to prescribe the extent of the effect of
judgments, not determine whether they have an effect.17 Other scholars
agree with Congress' use of its power under the FFCC, citing historical
evidence that the drafters of the United States Constitution intended
Congress to use the FFCC in precisely such a substantive manner.1 8
Thus, the issue as to which understanding of the FFCC is correct is a
preliminary question in determining whether DOMA violates the FFCC.
Against this controverted background another issue regarding
DOMA arises: scholars have consistently recognized same-sex marriage
and civil unions as two different relationships.'9 The federal DOMA and
some of the state DOMAs' language seem only to permit states not to
recognize same-sex marriage.20 They mention nothing of civil unions.21
15 H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 26 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930.
Specifically, Congress cites the second sentence of Article IV Section 1, which states:
"Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
i6 See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant
Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 307, 309 (1998) (arguing
that DOMA is an unconstitutional use of Congress' power under the FFCC); Ralph U.
Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of
Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998) (arguing that Congress properly employed
its power to proscribe the effect of judgments under the FFCC).
17 See infra Part III.A.1 for further discussion of Congress' role as procedural and the
weaknesses of that argument.
18 See infra Part III.A.1 for deeper analysis regarding the view that Congress' role is
substantive and the support for this argument.
19 Barbara J. Cox, But lWiy Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions, Lanw, Same-
Sex Marriage, and Separate but (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 113-15 (2000); Mark Strasser,
Some Observations about DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 20 CAP.
U. L. REV. 363, 374 (2002). But see Johnson, supra note 3, at 331 (stating that it would not be
to difficult to argue that civil unions are marriages in all but name).
20 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (stating that a relationship treated like a marriage in
another state need not be recognized by other state if they so choose). Compare ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 25-101(c) (2000) (stating that "[miarriage between persons of the same sex is void
and prohibited" and that, pursuant to section 25-112(a), "[mlarriages valid by the laws of
the place where contracted are valid in this state, except marriages that are void and
prohibited by § 25-101"), With FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(1), (2) (West 2001) (stating that
marriage or any relationship treated as a marriage in any jurisdiction is not recognized for
any purpose in that state).
21 Johnson, supra note 3, at 328. So far, states have honored Vermont's distinction
between civil unions and marriage. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 48 (Ga. Ct. App.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 [2004], Art. 7
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So far, states have not applied their DOMAs, the existence of which is
conditioned upon the federal DOMA, to civil unions. 22 However, the
potential exists. This raises an important question as to whether states
could use such an interpretation and application of not only the state,
but federal DOMA and still maintain the DOMAs' constitutionality. 23
This Note argues that both federal and state DOMAs are
constitutional implementations of both Congressional and state power
under the FFCC. However, civil unions cannot validly be interpreted to
fall under either the federal or state DOMAs. Specifically, this Note will
show that although both Congress and state legislatures can
constitutionally deny recognition of same-sex marriages, neither
Congress nor the states can deny recognition of civil unions under the
same-sex marriage language of the federal and state DOMAs. To that
end, Part II of this Note provides both the legal background and purpose
of the FFCC, as well as the FFCC's application to both heterosexual and
same-sex marriage.24 Part III discusses the constitutionality of denying
full faith and credit, with its implicitly incorporated conflict of laws
doctrine, to civil unions, and the implication of denying full faith and
credit in light of state sovereignty. 25 Finally, Part IV proposes model
amendments to the federal DOMA as well as state DOMAs to resolve
their limitation regarding civil unions.26
II. BACKGROUND
Before considering the constitutionality of DOMAs under the FFCC
and their application to civil unions, it is necessary to understand the
purpose and meaning of the FFCC and its application to marriage, as
well as recent changes in the status of marriage. Thus, Part A discusses
2002) (stating that for the purposes of the court's analysis, civil unions are not the same as
marriage).
22 See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 180 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Burns, 560
S.E.2d at 48. See infra notes 185-208 and accompanying text for a detailed examination of
these cases.
23 See infra Parts III.A.2, III.A.3 (analyzing DOMA's validity under the FFCC).
24 See infra Part II (discussing how Congress and the Supreme Court have traditionally
understood the FFCC's role and its implementation regarding marriage, and how recent
state legislation raises issues regarding that tradition).
25 See infra Part III (addressing the constitutionality of both the federal and state DOMAs
in light of the FFCC's traditional understanding, and evaluating the problem of applying
DOMAs to civil unions).
26 See infra Part IV (addressing the problem of applying DOMAs to civil unions by
proposing changes to DOMAs that avoid this problem).
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the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.27 Part B explains its
traditional application to marriage.28 Last, Part C introduces the current
state of the law regarding same-sex marriages and its possible
ramifications for civil unions. 29
A. The Purpose and Function of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
Article IV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution states that
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State." 3° The founders
included this clause to ensure that the states, though independent and
sovereign, would function as a unified nation by offering other states the
same level of faith and credit it rendered to its own laws.31 Specifically,
27 See infra text accompanying notes 30-91 (explaining the intent behind the inclusion of
the FFCC in the United States Constitution and the roles of Congress and the Supreme
Court in implementing it).
28 See infra text accompanying notes 92-134 (discussing the role FFCC has had in
ensuring validity for marriage among the states).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 135-214 (addressing new developments in marriage
and marriage-like relationships that may create problems under the FFCC).
30 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Further, the clause states that "Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof." Id. The Supreme Court interpreted "full faith" literally to mean not just
some credit, but full credit must be given to other states. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40
(1938) (holding that a divorce granted in Virginia on grounds not recognized in the District
of Columbia is nonetheless binding in the District of Columbia provided that Virginia is the
state of domicile for the moving party). However, states have limited how fully credit is
given to ensure that other states' laws do not apply to the exclusion of the forum state's
law. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. United Eng'rs and Constructors, Inc., 584 A.2d 675 (Me. 1991)
(holding that employee injuries sustained in New Hampshire should be borne by Maine
employer despite recovery under New Hampshire law because, even though full faith and
credit requires recognizing New Hampshire law of recovery, Maine has an interest in
providing its residents with compensation for their injuries from their employers).
31 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 585 (1951) (stating that the FFCC offers
unification, not centralization, by allowing each state to render judgments that will be
honored anywhere in the United States); see also Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951)
(stating that the FFCC alters the state's status from absolute independence to an integral
part of the United States); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948) (stating that the FFCC
aggregates independent sovereign states into a nation); Order of United Commercial
Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 618 (1947) (stating that the FFCC ensures that
remedies for obligations are provided by granting recognition of that obligation among the
unified states); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294-95 (1942) (stating that the
FFCC integrates sovereign states into a single nation). This notion was found originally in
English common law as comity, in which a sovereign nation recognizes the policies,
legislation, and judicial acts of another country. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1948).
The founders borrowed this concept of comity from the English common law and
incorporated it into the Constitution through the FFCC. Id. at 546. Rather than applying it
to recognizing another country's laws, the founders redefined it and applied it to the
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 [2004], Art. 7
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the FFCC serves as a means of preserving rights granted or affirmed
through public records and judicial proceedings by guaranteeing such
records and proceedings recognition and validity in other states.32 By
offering such validity to other states' records and proceedings, the FFCC
prevents re-litigation of already adjudicated issues.33 The FFCC is not
concerned with social or political considerations surrounding the merits
of an already adjudicated case, but rather with "the techniques of the
law" as the needs for such techniques arise in a given case.34
As a result of its prevention of re-litigation, the FFCC ensures
maximum enforcement of state laws and statutes among states.35
Additionally, it coordinates the application of laws, thereby ensuring
consistent and just results.36 The FFCC achieves such consistency by
aiding states in resolving interstate controversies in which state policies
differ.37
recognition of other state's laws to limit the states' status as independent sovereigns. Id.
Despite this refinement of the definition of comity to that of the recognition among states of
other state's laws, some courts still use the term comity as short hand for the FFCC. See,
e.g., Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that based upon
comity grounds Indiana would recognize as legitimate a marriage validly contracted and
celebrated elsewhere); Goode v. Goode, 997 P.2d 244, 245 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that
under comity principles, marriages celebrated in other states are valid in Oregon unless
they violate Oregon's public policy).
32 Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939) (holding
that California is not required to apply Massachusetts' worker's compensation law under
the FFCC because California has its own statute adequately covering that issue). See
generally Pink v. AAA Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
33 Jon-Peter Kelly, Act of Infidelity: ihy the Defense of Marriage Act is Unfaithfiu to the
Constitution, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 219 (1997).
34 ROBERT H. JACKSON, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE LAWYER'S CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3-4 (1945). States do, however, weigh political and social considerations
when determining whether to offer full faith and credit to another state's law as they often
have an incentive for recognition of another state's laws, namely, that their own laws will
be recognized in another state. Strasser, supra note 19, at 376.
35 Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1965). The Supreme Court
specifically recognized statutes to constitute public acts for purposes of the FFCC. Carroll
v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 411 (1955).
36 Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 438 (3d Cir. 1966). Congress
enacted § 1738 of Title 28 of the United States Code to maintain uniformity, requiring, for
example, that each court verify the validity of its records and judicial proceedings by
affixing a seal. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). If such a seal is affixed, Congress requires that
other states recognize that record or judicial proceeding. Id.
37 Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 553 (1947). Thus, the convenience of law does not serve
as a balance with which to determine the applicability of the clause. Id. at 554. Further,
some states strictly apply full faith and credit without evaluating the rightness of the other
state's policy. See, e.g., M & R Invs. Co. v. Hacker, 511 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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Juxtaposed against the FFCC are states' rights.38 States' rights are a
residual power of the Constitution, which leaves all undelegated powers
to the states. 39 The founders, in including this concept, hoped to prevent
the federal government from requiring states to enforce federal laws,
thereby creating double security under both the FFCC and state
sovereignty for the people in their government.40 This security serves
the founders' intent to create concurrent authority of the state and
federal governments over the people, each protected from incursion by
the other.41 Inherent in this is a conflict: to which entity will deference
1987) (refusing to enforce a Nevada gambling debt judgment because it violated Florida's
public policy); Brown v. Brown, 377 So. 2d 438, 441 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (holding the
Louisiana court must give an Arkansas divorce decree the same force it would have in
Arkansas); Hirson v. United Stores Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (App. Div. 1942) (stating
that local policy may not override the full faith and credit clause). However, most states
limit their application to those laws that do not contravene their own state policy. See, e.g.,
Univ. of Iowa Press v. Urrea, 440 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that Iowa
publisher who used residents' information without their consent could be sued under Iowa
invasion of privacy law because the Iowa Tort Claims Act was virtually identical to
Georgia's and thus did not contravene Georgia's public policy); Meenach v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 891 S.W.2d 398, 401-02 (Ky. 1995) (modifying a Michigan injunction to permit only
testimony regarding non-confidential relevant facts on public policy grounds). Some state
and federal courts balance the governmental interests involved to determine whether full
faith and credit should be granted in instances where another state's law contradicts the
forum state's public policy. See, e.g., Sheerin v. Steele, 240 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957);
Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 820 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1991).
38 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that background checks required
of law enforcement officers under Congress' Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act was
unconstitutional as it required states to execute federal laws).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating that "powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people"); Printz, 521 U.S. at 919.
40 Printz, 521 U.S. at 920, 922. In Printz, Congress was in the process of implementing the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ("Brady Act"). Id. at 902. This Act required a
national system for checking handgun purchasers' backgrounds. Id. Because Congress
wanted the background checks to be carried out immediately, it passed some interim
provisions to the states until the Brady Act was operative. Id. Plaintiffs, as chief law
enforcement officers for counties in Montana and Arizona, filed suits challenging the
constitutionality of the Act. Id. at 903. The District Court held that the background check
provision was unconstitutional, but that the remainder of the Act was constitutional. Id.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the entire Act to be unconstitutional. Id. The Supreme
Court affirmed, stating that because the background check provision was part of a federal
law that required states to enforce it, the provision violated principles of state sovereignty.
Id. at 929.
41 Id. at 920. The legal system was designed to provide two orders of government, each
with their own set of rights and obligations to the people. Id. States, as well as the federal
government, are expected to represent and remain accountable to their citizens. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 [2004], Art. 7
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be rendered?42 Such situations are further confounded when both
federal and state governments have an interest in the issue at hand.4 3
The Supreme Court has evaluated this conflict and determined that the
issue turns on whether the law in question serves the interests of the
individual or the state.44 The Constitution "confers upon Congress the
power to regulate individuals, not States."45 Consequently, deference is
given to state laws where state governance is at issue.46 Conversely, state
law must yield to federal law where federal law regulates individuals. 47
In a limited fashion, the FFCC also protects states' rights where state
laws conflict with other states.48 The FFCC prevents "entrenchment on
the interests of other [s]tates" through the over-application of a state's
own law in another state.49 States' rights are further advanced as the
FFCC leaves the forum state the opportunity to apply its own laws to an
issue while, at the same time, preventing re-litigation of issues already
adjudicated in other states.5° Thus, once a court enters a judgment, that
judgment is upheld in every other state, unless that state has more
adequately addressed the present issue through its own statutes.51
42 Id. at 919. This determination fundamentally rests on whether the powers being used
are those reserved to Congress as an enumerated power, or to the states as a residual
power. Id.; see U.S. CoNST. amend. X.
43 See generally Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (recognizing that both federal and state government
have an interest in handgun control).
44 Id. at 920 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
45 Id.
46 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot
compel states to provide for disposal of radioactive waste within their own borders
because Congress is governing not just national radioactive waste disposal, but state
disposal as well, a clear violation of state sovereignty).
47 Id. The Court further stated that Congress, though it may have the power, cannot
directly compel or prohibit states to act. Id. Congress may, of course, encourage states to
act in a particular fashion. Id. But the ultimate decision must be the states. Id.
4 Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270 (1980) (holding that the FFCC does
not preclude receiving disability benefits from two different states where one state's law is
provided as an exclusive remedy because that state had no legitimate interest in limiting
recovery to just one state).
49 Id. at 272; Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-
Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 222 (1998).
50 Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1952) (holding that a previous judgment that a
marriage was annulled under New York law was entitled to full faith and credit in
proceedings in Illinois determining whether a divorced Illinois resident could marry a
Nevada resident whose previous marriage was deemed invalid under New York law).
51 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436-37 (1943), overruled in part on other
grounds by Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980) (holding that an employee
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Congress governs the application of the FFCC.52 Congress first
construed the FFCC through an implementing statute.5 3 This general
implementing statute ensures interstate enforcement of state
judgments.54  Congress has narrowed the implementing statute for
specific instances.5 5 For example, pursuant to the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act ("PKPA"), 6 Congress limited the application of full faith
may not receive Workmen's Compensation in Texas if the employee has already been
compensated under the law of another state).
52 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The second sentence of the FFCC states that "Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
53 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). This statute, the first enacted by Congress and commonly
referred to as the implementing statute of the FFCC, states that:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the
United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the
seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto. The records and
judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other
courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by
the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists,
together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said
attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial
proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts
of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
Id.
54 Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflict-of-LoWs
Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1235, 1238 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)).
55 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000) (limiting which jurisdictions can honor custody
judgments in other states). Congress has also required enforcement of other state laws. See
28 U.S.C. § 1738B(d) (providing that a state which has made a child support order
consistent with this statute would have exclusive jurisdiction over the order).
56 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. Specifically, the relevant part of the statute reads:
(c) A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a
State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if-
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home
State within six months before the date of the commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of his
removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a
contestant continues to live in such State;
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a
court of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant
connection with such State other than mere physical presence in such
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and credit in custody determinations through stipulating which
jurisdictions can validly recognize and address previous custody
determinations.5 7  Thus, Congress abrogates full faith and credit
requirements regarding this issue.58 Statutes such as the PKPA do not,
however, demonstrate the extent of Congress' power under the FFCC.
Nor does the language of Article IV, Section 1, make Congress's role as
implementer of the FFCC clear.5 9 Consequently, the Supreme Court is
turned to for further guidance in understanding the breadth of the FFCC.
The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the limitations of this clause
for both state and federal courts.60 Like the founders, the Court
State, and (II) there is available in such State substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has
been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the
child because the child, a sibling, or parent of the child has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is
in issue is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody or
visitation of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that
such court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of
this section.
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child
custody or visitation determination consistently with the provisions of
this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of
this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of
the child or of any contestant.
Id. § 1738A(c)-(d).
57 Id. § 1738A; see Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (upholding the PKPA as a
proper and constitutional use of Congress' power under the FFCC). Using its power under
the FFCC, Congress specified the jurisdictional and substantive provisions required for
recognition of out-of-state custody orders when the issue arose as to which state's
judgment should be upheld. Jennie R. Shuki-Kunze, The "Defenseless" Marriage Act: The
Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act as an Extension of Congressional Power Under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351, 366 (1998).
5 Id. at 374.
59 Strasser, supra note 16, at 309. The first sentence of Article IV, Section 1, appears to
give Congress only a procedural duty in applying the FFCC. Id. However, the second
sentence seems to imply that Congress may, in fact, govern what should and should not be
granted full faith and credit. Id.
60 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 585 (1951). See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The Supreme Court has taken on this role of arbiter because the
FFCC serves a federal purpose, namely that of preventing the centralization of federal
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recognizes that the chief purpose of the FFCC is to ensure that judgments
from other forums are recognized. 61 However, the Court has held that
the FFCC does not automatically compel states to follow other state laws;
rather, the nature of the law in question determines the level of credit it
receives.62  Specifically, the Court makes a distinction between
judgments and state law.63
The Supreme Court has held that the implementing statute of the
FFCC requires that state judgments be given the same effect in other
states as the judgment would have received in the state where it was
rendered.64 Thus, judgments are legally unassailable in another state
unless that state lacks jurisdiction.65 No roving public policy exception
exists regarding credit given judgments.66 Consequently, the test the
Court will apply in analyzing whether a state gave appropriate
recognition to a judgment is "exacting," which holds the states to the
highest standard in justifying why they refused to honor another state's
judgment.67
government while maintaining unity among the states. Muelberger, 340 U.S. at 585. This
role is an interpretive one, addressing what are the permissible limitations of the FFCC. Id.
61 Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 88 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring); Shuki-Kunze, supra
note 57, at 358. However, the Supreme Court's accurate understanding of the purpose of
the FFCC, namely, its unifying function, is too limited as it ignores other relevant historical
purposes and understandings of the clause. See infra Part 1II.A.1.
62 See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) ("A final judgment in one
State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and
persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.");
Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 279 n.23 (1980) ("[Tlhe purpose of that
provision was to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and judicial
proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity in other states .... ").
& Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. "A court may be guided by the forum State's 'public policy' in
determining the law applicable to a controversy. But our decisions support no 'roving
public policy exception' to the full faith and credit due judgments." Id. (citations omitted).
64 Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813). This same effect is only required as
to record evidence. Id. The FFCC operates as to evidence only. Id. at 486 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). See infra Part III.A.1 for further discussion of the FFCC's historical
interpretation.
65 Borchers, supra note 7, at 164.
66 Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. Conversely, as to state laws, the Court held that state courts
may be guided by their own public policy in determining which state law to apply. Id.
This option is not, however, available for judgments. Id.
67 Id. Under such a standard, the Court will require a compelling reason for denying
recognition to another state's judgment. Id. This requirement to uphold other state's
judgments is particularly necessary where issues of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion - res judicata -are at issue. Id.
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However, when the recognition of a state law rather than another
state's judgment is in question, the Court applies a different, more
flexible test.68 In such a case, the Court has held that the state court may
choose which of the two competing public policies involved it will
follow. 69 This permits states to enforce their own laws as well as other
states' laws at their own discretion. 70 To determine this, the FFCC has
been interpreted to imply conflict-of-laws principles.71 As a result, sister
state laws can be applied or refused application at the discretion of the
states, provided the decision complies with conflict-of-laws principles.72
Conflict-of-laws principles facilitate such compliance through their
public policy exception. 73 This exception states that if a law violates an
important public policy of a state, that state may use the public policy
68 Id. at 232-33. Laws such as legislative measures and common law rules are governed
under this more lenient standard. Id. at 232.
69 E.g. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951) (holding that a wrongful death action
brought under an Illinois statute could be brought in Wisconsin because Wisconsin must
recognize Illinois law under the FFCC); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (holding that law of California applied in a Workmen's
Compensation claim rather than Alaska's despite the fact that the injury occurred in Alaska
because the contract was made in California). This public policy exception is derived from
the conflict-of-laws doctrine. Shuki-Kunze, supra note 57, at 361; see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971). This exception can be played as a "trump
card" to the FFCC should the judgment in question be "repugnant to the state's laws and
legitimate public policies." Id. Thus, "[aJlthough states are bound by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to enforce judgments, they are free through their forum choice-of-law rules
to decide whether or not to apply foreign law to a dispute properly before the court." L.
Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex "Marriage": How Will
States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 30 (1998). Critics of the
public policy exception argue that it provides a "substitute for analysis. The concepts stand
in the way of careful thought, of discriminating distinctions, and of true policy
development in the conflict of laws." Monrad G. Paulsen and Michael I. Sovern, "Public
Policy" in Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 1016 (1956). Such criticism of the public
policy exception holds true today. Hogue, supra, at 32.
70 See generally Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. 532.
71 Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724 n.1 (1988) ("The conflicts law embodied in
the Full Faith and Credit Clause allows room for common-law development, just as did the
international conflicts law that it originally embodied.").
72 Borchers, supra note 7, at 164.
73 Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 83, 94 (1998). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2)
(1971). In this manner, the Supreme Court has incorporated conflict-of-laws principles into
FFCC analysis. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (stating that "the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law in violation of its own
legitimate public policy").
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exception to prevent application of another state's law.74 The specific
criteria that govern the application of the public policy exception are
unclear.75 Generally, if a state is competent to legislate in a particular
area, it need not substitute other state statutes for its own. 76
Additionally, the Supreme Court is particularly concerned about the
denial of constitutional guarantees; consequently, if another state's law
violates the Federal Constitution, that law is not entitled to full faith and
credit in the forum state.d Last, the public policy exception is typically
only invoked when a state's law is repugnant to another state as it either
violates some fundamental principle of justice, morality, or deep-rooted
tradition.78 Beyond this, states appear to have unlimited discretion in
applying the public policy exception.79
The Supreme Court historically permitted this view of the public
policy exception under the FFCC to be governed by state interest.80
However, the Court no longer weighs state interests to determine which
state law will apply.81 The Supreme Court now upholds an additional
limitation to the public policy exception: the state which wishes to
impose its own law must be the state in which the parties are
domiciled.82 In doing this, the Court requires the contacts of the State
74 Strasser, supra note 19, at 367. This public policy exception is a product of the
common law. Hogue, supra note 69, at 32.
7 Hogue, supra note 69, at 34.
76 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 160 (1945) (dismissing plaintiff's
demand that defendant be enjoined from interfering with plaintiff's business and granting
plaintiff a license to do business in Wisconsin because Wisconsin law served to protect its
citizens by limiting the number of mutual insurance companies that could do business in
Wisconsin through fees).
77 See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (stating that a
judgment rendered in another state that violates due process should not be accorded full
faith and credit elsewhere).
78 See, e.g., Greschler v. Greschler, 414 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that a divorce
decree granted in the Dominican Republic was valid despite wife's claims of fraud).
79 Id.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that a class action claim
must be modified because Kansas did not have jurisdiction over all defendant investors,
and that Kansas could not apply Kansas law to all of the investors); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (holding Minnesota law could be applied to plaintiff's insurance
claim for the death of husband even though plaintiff's husband was killed in Wisconsin
because husband had been a resident of Minnesota for sixteen years).
81 See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 419 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (holding
that a state's exclusive remedies for personal injury do not limit remedies that can be
sought when applying another state's law).
82 "Domicile" refers to more than just residency. It is defined as "[tihe place at which a
person is physically present and that the person regards as home; a person's true, fixed,
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with the parties who are involved in current litigation to be evaluated.83
For example, if the only contact a party has with a state is that the injury
took place in that state, another state's law is likely to be applied,
perhaps the law of the state which the injured considers home.84 By
establishing this domicile requirement, the Court has further limited the
use of the public policy exception.
The Court has clearly established that the FFCC will apply to the
states pursuant to conflict-of-laws principles. 85 Specifically, the Court
has denied a roving public policy exception to the FFCC as to judgments
while permitting such an exception for state laws. 86 However, the Court
has not resolved the fundamental ambiguity in Article IV, Section 1,
regarding whether the FFCC grants Congress a procedural or
substantive role in determining the application of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.87 This distinction is of utmost importance.88 If Congress's
role is procedural, Congress could articulate a system by which full faith
and credit could be efficiently granted.89 However, if Congress' role is
substantive, Congress could determine what, and to what extent, the
states must grant full faith and credit.90 Because Congress's role is
ambiguous in this regard, how much power Congress has to limit the
FFCC in substantive areas such as marriage or, more controversially,
civil unions, appears uncertain. 91
principal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even
though currently residing elsewhere." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 501 (7th ed. 1999).
83 See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308, cited in Borchers, supra note 7, at 161 (stating that this
requirement ensures that the law chosen is not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair). This
modern test, labeled the "significant relationship test" under the conflict-of-laws doctrine,
requires that the state making public policy arguments to invalidate a judgment must be
the state that has the strongest connection with the parties. Shuki-Kunze, supra note 57, at
364; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(1) (1971). The only way for the
state not to apply its own law, according to the Supreme Court, is if the state has significant
contacts with the parties or the transaction involved and application of the forum law
cannot be justified under traditional choice-of-law principles. Borchers, supra note 7, at 164.
84 Id.
85 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 n.1 (1988).
8 See supra text accompanying notes 64-72 (explaining this distinction and its
importance).
87 See Strasser, supra note 16, at 309.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 For further analysis of Congress' role under the FFCC, see supra Part III.A.1.
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B. The Application of the FFCC to Marriage
Congress has not had to speak regarding traditional marriage and
the FFCC. Marriage92 impacts a variety of other legal issues, such as
divorce,93 custody,94 inheritance,95 and tort claims.96 Because of this,
marriage issues have been traditionally reserved to the states.
97
Historically, the states have consistently recognized marriages entered
into in other states.98 State courts have typically held that if a marriage is
validly recognized and celebrated in another state, they would recognize
92 For the purposes of this Note, "marriage," unless otherwise defined, refers to its
traditional definition of a valid and celebrated union between a man and a woman. See 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2002). In contrast, common law marriages are defined as a marriage "that takes
legal effect, without license or ceremony, when a couple live together as husband and wife,
intend to be married, and hold themselves out to others as a married couple." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 986 (7th ed. 1999). Such marriages were treated with widely varying
results due to the gradual demise of their recognition. See, e.g., Thomas v. Sullivan, 922
F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff, a "widow," was not entitled to social security
benefits because she and decedent had not ceremonially married and New York refuses to
recognize common-law marriage). See infra text accompanying notes 115-22 for further
discussion of common-law marriages.
93 See, e.g., Chambrello v. Chambrello, No. FA990080464S, 2002 WL 1492175, at *1 (Conn.
Super. June 10, 2002) (applying North Carolina's divorce requirement of separation for a
year in its analysis because the plaintiffs had filed a motion for divorce there, and finding it
satisfied). See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of divorce
recognition.
94 Strasser, supra note 19, at 364; see, e.g., Muckle v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303,
308 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating that once the court has determined jurisdiction, it may
determine not only marital issues, but custody and support issues as well).
95 Strasser, supra note 19, at 364; see, e.g., Shadwick v. Young, No. E1999-02607-CDA-R3-
CV, 2000 WL 144111, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2000). In Slhdzvick, the plaintiff claimed
inheritance rights of her deceased spouse on the grounds that they had been united in a
common-law marriage. Id. The court upheld her claim, stating that public policy is to
sustain marriage. Id. at *3. Because the defendant and the party attempting to intervene
could not show that the plaintiff and the deceased were married at the common law, the
plaintiff was granted her inheritance rights. Id. at *5.
% Strasser, supra note 19, at 364; see, e.g., In re Bester, 828 So. 2d 644, 647-48 (La. Ct. App.
2002). The court held that a child's father could not intervene in a wrongful death claim
because no filiation had been established between him and his child either through
marriage to the child's mother or through other means established by law. Id.
97 Solimine, supra note 73, at 84. In fact, "[tihe entire issue of interstate recognition of
marriage would be moot, of course, if marital validity were governed by federal law." Id.
at 84. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (holding that a state "has absolute
right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens
shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved").
98 Strasser, supra note 16, at 329; see, e.g., Parish v. Minveille, 217 So. 2d 684, 688 (La. Ct.
App. 1969) (stating that "we are obliged to give effect to ... marriages when they are
validly contracted in another state. This is commanded by the full faith and credit clause of
the United States Constitution, Art. 4, Section 1").
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that marriage as valid, provided that it does not violate the public policy
of that state.99  However, this standard is applied to traditional
marriages, which are celebrated civilly or ceremonially3 °° The states
loosened this requirement of a marriage celebration for common law
marriages, which have been historically recognized. 101
Because of this loosened requirement, most states will recognize a
marriage from another state provided that the marriage was legitimately
and validly entered into in another state.102 Some states do so to
demonstrate "a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right,
99 Hogue, supra note 69, at 31-32 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 134
(1934) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1969)). Both the First
and Second Restatements of Conflict of Laws have been widely adopted. Solimine, supra
note 73, at 99. The First Restatement states that "a marriage is valid everywhere if the
requirements of the marriage law of the state where the contract of marriage takes place are
complied with." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (1934). Similarly, the
Second Restatement articulates that "[a] marriage which satisfies the requirements of the
state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it
violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971); see, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). This can include recognition of marriages not typically recognized in
the forum state. Mason, 775 N.E.2d at 709. For example, in Mason, the couple seeking
divorce were first cousins. Id. at 708. They had been married in Tennessee, but were
seeking dissolution or annulment of their marriage. Id. The husband claimed that, because
Indiana does not permit marriage between first cousins, the marriage was invalid. Id.
However, the court held that although Indiana does not recognize such marriages, it was
validly contracted and celebrated in Tennessee. Id. at 709. Applying comity principles, the
court determined that the marriage was valid. Id. For a further discussion of comity, see
supra note 31. Therefore, it found that the trial court did not err in determining that it could
only dissolve, not annul, the marriage. Mason, 775 N.E.2d at 709. Historically, merely
participating in a validly celebrated marriage in another state was not a guarantee for the
recognition of marriage among states. Strasser, supra note 19, at 366. Other factors,
particularly the nature of the marriage, affected whether such a marriage was valid. Id. at
366-67. For further discussion of such policy concerns, see infra notes 111-22 and
accompanying text.
100 Estate of Whyte v. Whyte, 614 N.E.2d 372, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that
although current statutes require marriage to be celebrated, such a requirement does not
apply to common law marriages). Historically, because of America's Christian heritage,
marriages that did not offend the tenets of that faith were to be encouraged by their
recognition among states. Lewis A. Silverman, Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit,
and Marital Status, 89 Ky. L.J. 1075, 1087 (2000). The celebration standard of marriage
recognition seems to be under attack in light of DOMAs, both federal and state. See
Solimine, supra note 73, at 95.
101 For a further discussion of common law marriages, see infra notes 115-22, and
accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., Mason, 775 N.E.2d at 709.
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but out of deference and good will."0 3 Thus, even if the nature of the
marriage at bar might be contrary to the state's law regarding marriage,
it can in some instances be offered full faith and credit.1° 4
Some states, however, have established a few limitations when
recognizing a marriage granted in another state.105 One such limitation
is if the marriage in question is void under the enforcing state's statute. 06
For example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals voided the second
marriage of a woman from another state because the second marriage
had occurred during Wisconsin's statutory waiting period between
marriages 0 7 Because the woman was domiciled in Wisconsin and
Wisconsin had a statute on point regarding remarriage, Wisconsin
applied its own law, which required a six month waiting period before
remarrying. 08 The remarriage violated Wisconsin's statute, so the court
deemed the marriage void. 0 9 Such a refusal to offer full faith and credit
is constitutional; the Supreme Court permits such restrictions because
the forum state had its own statutory law on the issue at bar. 10
Additionally, states have validly used the public policy exception
under the conflict-of-laws doctrine, refusing to recognize marriages if
such marriages violate the public policy of the forum state."' For
103 Id. However, some states are adamantly unwilling to recognize other states' laws, just
as others are willing. See, e.g., Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1979)
(stating that it would not apply Wisconsin law because "the Minnesota rule is better"). The
Supreme Court has found this "prideful unwillingness" constitutional under the FFCC. See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981), cited in Borchers, supra note 7, at 169.
104 See Parish v. Minveille, 217 So. 2d 684, 688 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
105 See In re Estate of Toutant, 633 N.W.2d 692, 700 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
even though a remarriage had taken place in another state, it was void because it violated
Wisconsin's requirement of waiting six months before remarrying, and Wisconsin is
permitted to apply its own policy standards to its own citizens).
106 See id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. The court further stated that because Wisconsin was able to govern this area of law
competently, the full faith and credit clause did not require it to yield to another state's
conflicting statute. Id.
110 See Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402,409-10 (1952).
111 Strasser, supra note 19, at 367; e.g., Bronislawa K. v. Tadeusz K., 393 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535
(Fam. Ct. 1977) (holding that the court was willing to apply Polish marriage law because
that law did not violate New York's public policy regarding marriage). This public policy
exception is derived from conflict-of-laws principles. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 121, 132 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283
(1971). States adopting the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA") cannot utilize
the public policy exception as it is explicitly rejected as a defense under the Act. See UNIF.
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 210, 9A U.L.A. 194 (1998).
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example, if a marriage in a former state is considered bigamous or
polygamous in a latter state, the latter state often will not recognize it.11 2
Similarly, if a state has a strong local state interest in the marital status
and welfare of a state's residents for purposes of alimony
determinations, deciding according to those interests would not violate
the FFCC because the state interests outweigh the interest of uniformity
for which the clause stands.113 However, the application of the public
policy exception is limited to only those circumstances where a "strong"
public policy interest of the domicile state exists, or where the marriage
in question is "repugnant to [that state's] laws and policies."11 4
A specific example of such a strong policy interest is found in
common-law marriages. A common-law marriage is defined as a
marriage "that takes legal effect, without license or ceremony, when a
couple live together as husband and wife, intend to be married, and hold
themselves out to others as a married couple."" 5 As a general rule,
112 Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934). This doctrine states:
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either
party, though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration
have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere in the following
cases: (a) polygamous marriage, (b) incestuous marriage between
persons so closely related that their marriage is contrary to a strong
public policy of the domicil.
Id.; see Bronislawa K., 393 N.Y.S.2d at 535 (holding that because the marriage at hand was
not bigamous, it was not void as a result of public policy). In addition to bigamy and
polygamy, incestuous marriages, interracial marriages, marriages between minors, and
certain alleged common-law marriages have been historically found to violate states' public
policies. Shuki-Kunze, supra note 57, at 362. Such decisions vary from state to state.
Strasser, supra note 19, at 367-68. For example, some states will not recognize marriages
between first cousins. E.g., Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ohio 1987).
Others will allow such marriages to be celebrated so long as the couple in question cannot
reproduce. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (2000). DOMA is the first time, however, that
such exceptions have been made permissible under a federal statute. Cynthia M. Reed,
When Love, Comity, and Justice Conquer Borders: INS Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 28
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97 (1996) (citing Same Sex Marriage: Hearings on S. 1740: The
Defense of Marriage Act Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996)).
113 E.g., Borys v. Borys, 386 A.2d 366, 376 (N.J. 1978).
114 Silverman, supra note 100, at 1090-91; see, e.g., Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92, 95
(9th Cir. 1951) (holding that a proxy marriage in Nevada was not inconsistent with Nevada
law nor was there a strongly conflicting public policy in the domicile state); State v. Austin,
234 S.E.2d 657, 663 (W. Va. 1977) (stating that "a State is not required to recognize a
marriage performed in another State which is repugnant to the former State's statutes or
public policy"). Historically, what was deemed repugnant was determined under the
general principles of the Christian tradition. Silverman, supra note 100, at 1091 (citing
Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927, 928 (E.D. La. 1925), which states, "marriage which are
contrary to the general view of Christendom" fit the public policy exception).
115 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 986(7th Ed. 1999).
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courts have consistently held that common law marriages are recognized
among states under the FFCC." 6 States have a particular interest in
sustaining, not upsetting, marriages.117 Thus, even though some states
no longer recognize common-law marriages, they will uphold those
validly recognized in other states.118
However, states which would otherwise recognize common-law
marriages will not recognize them if they violate their public policy.19
In particular, states are concerned that their citizens are trying to
circumvent their state's law by entering into a common-law marriage in
another state that recognizes common-law marriages. 120 Frequently,
citizens have actively left the state in pursuit of a type of marriage that
they wanted but that their state did not recognize. 121 States have
consistently not recognized common-law marriages in these instances,
using their public policy exception to deny them recognition.122
116 See, e.g., Allen v. Storer, 600 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that if
domiciles of another state validly enter into a common-law marriage, that marriage will
move with them to Illinois, despite Illinois' refusal to recognize such a marriage under its
own laws); Netecke v. State, 715 So. 2d 449, 450 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that if a
common law marriage is validly entered into under the laws of another state, Louisiana
will recognize it, even though its laws do not recognize it); Raum v. Rest. Assoc., 675
N.Y.S.2d 343, 347-48 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that even though New York does not
recognize common-law marriages, it will grant full faith and credit to such marriages if
they are valid in the state where they were contracted).
117 Shadwick v. Young, No. E1999-02607-CDA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 144111, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Feb. 9, 2000).
118 E.g., Compagnoni v. Compagnoni, 591 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(stating that although Florida does not recognize common law marriages entered into after
1968, "Florida w[ould] respect a common law marriage when entered into in a state which
recognizes common law marriages"); Ram v. Ramharack, 571 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (1991)
(stating that although common law marriages were outlawed in 1933, New York would
still honor a common law marriage legally recognized in another state).
119 E.g., Hesington v. Hesington's Estate, 640 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that a weekend in Oklahoma is insufficient to establish a common-law marriage and
violates Missouri public policy).
120 See Grant v. Superior Court, 555 P.2d 895 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Goldin v. Goldin, 426
A.2d 410 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); In re Brack's Estate, 329 N.W.3d 432 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982).
121 E.g., Grant, 555 P.2d at 897 (holding that staying overnight in a Texas hotel was
insufficient to establish a common-law marriage); Goldin, 426 A.2d at 415 (holding that a ski
weekend in Pennsylvania was insufficient grounds for the recognition of a common-law
marriage, especially when the couple shared the room with young children); Brack's Estate,
329 N.W.2d at 434 (stating that one night in a Georgia motel while enroute to Florida was
insufficient to establish a common law marriage).
122 As a result of this abuse of the FFCC, courts have required an investigation of the
couple's relationship to determine whether a common law marriage existed under the law
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All of these uses of the public policy exception are an inappropriate
use of the doctrine, however, if the state lacks jurisdiction over the
parties. 23 Jurisdiction is determined under the concept of domicile.124
Marriages that are entered into by two domiciles of a state are
guaranteed full faith and credit recognition of that marriage in another
state.125 States typically do not apply the public policy exception unless
the marriage in question is itself void in the domicile state. 26 However,
if the married party moves to and becomes domiciled in another state,
the validity of their marriage will be subject to the laws of their new
domicile state, not the state which granted their marriage.127 Domicile
clearly plays a critical part in the public policy analysis.128
Another component to marriage recognition can be inferred from the
recognition of divorce. By recognizing out-of-state divorces, states
implicitly affirm the recognition of out-of-state marriages. 29 Most states
have statutes offering full faith and credit to a divorce or an annulment
granted by another state provided that the state could competently grant
the divorce or annulment13 Implicit in such recognition is that the
of the couple's domicile, rather than the law where the marriage was entered into. See, e.g.,
Raum v. Rest. Assocs., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 347-48 (App. Div. 1998). Factors include financial
and living arrangements, and whether the couple held themselves out to the public as
married. Id. at 348. However, the state courts have held that such investigations may not
be unduly burdensome to the couple. Id.
123 See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
124 For a definition of domicile, see supra note 82.
125 See Williams, 325 U.S. at 229-30. Since the framing of the Constitution, domicile has
been recognized as the means by which a state is given power to recognize or dissolve a
marriage. Id. at 229; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
126 Silverman, supra note 100, at 1091. Thus, voidable marriages, such as underage
marriages, may be recognized by a state if the marriage is valid in the state where it was
celebrated. Id. at 1092.
127 See Williams, 325 U.S. at 230. However, if both parties to the divorce appear in the out-
of-state court and the issue of domicile is raised and decided, those parties cannot later
claim that court lacked jurisdiction because of the doctrine of res judicata, which prevents
re-litigation of the same issue in a separate proceeding. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.
581, 587 (1951).
128 Williams, 325 U.S. at 229.
129 See, e.g., Plaisance v. Plaisance, 836 So. 2d 166 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that so long
as spouse had the opportunity to contest the divorce, Louisiana would honor a divorce
decree from Arkansas). In Williams, the Supreme Court stated that marriage and divorce
both implicate similar interests as both are of concern not only to the individual parties, but
to society, and they affect personal rights. Williams, 325 U.S. at 230.
130 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1521 (1996) (stating that "[flull faith and credit shall
be given in all the courts of this State to a decree of divorce or annulment of marriage by a
court of competent jurisdiction in another state, territory or possession of the United
States"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1611 (2000) (stating that "[a] judgment or decree of divorce
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marriage itself was found to be valid by that state.131  Thus, by
recognizing a divorce decree of another state, the forum state not only
gives credit due to a judgment, but also grants recognition to the validity
of the original marriage itself.132
As to marriages, states are free to apply the public policy exception
as they see fit. States have consistently used the public policy exception
in areas of common-law marriages, polygamy, bigamy, and incestuous
marriages. 133 However, uniformity as to which of these marriages states
will or will not recognize does not, on the whole, exist.'3
C. The Full Faith and Credit Exception: DOMAs and Their Application
While the states have been willing to recognize out-of-state
marriages, and even common-law marriages, they have not been so
willing to recognize same-sex marriages nor in recent months, civil
unions.135 However, declining to extend full faith and credit to same-sex
marriage has not been independent of federal suggestion.1 36 Congress
has specifically addressed this issue.137 However, the Supreme Court, as
rendered in any other state or territory of the United States, in conformity with the laws
thereof, shall be given full faith and credit in this state .... "). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19-A, § 907 (West 1998) (limiting divorce recognition to only those from other states but
denying recognition of divorces granted to its own citizens by other states).
131 E.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that because Georgia
did not recognize the marriage the parties had entered into, it could not grant a divorce).
132 Id. Of course, a state must recognize a divorce granted in another state unless it lacks
jurisdiction because divorces are judgments, to which the Supreme Court requires full faith
and credit to be applied. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234 (1998).
133 Charles J. Butler, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress' Use of Narrative in the Debate
over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 847-48 (1998).
13 Silverman, supra note 100, at 1090.
135 See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (denying the
family court jurisdiction of a civil union dissolution because civil unions are not marriages,
and thus, do not fall under the scope of domestic relations); Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to grant visitation rights to an ex-wife because she violated
the visitation agreement prohibiting non-marital cohabitation by entering into a civil
union). Scholars oppose the civil union for disparate reasons -some because they do not
believe same-sex couples should receive any recognition, others because civil unions are
not offered sufficient recognition, falling short of full recognition as marriage. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Union, 64 ALB.
L. REV. 853, 854 (2001).
136 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (stating that same-sex marriages need not be recognized
among the states). For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 161-64 and
accompanying text.
137 See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
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final arbiter, has not spoken on this limitation on the FFCC.138 To explain
this issue, this Note first looks at the catalyst for the civil union debate:
the legalization of same-sex marriages in Hawaii.139 Then, this Note
discusses both federal and state responses to Hawaii's decision.140 Last,
this Note addresses the subsequent adoption of civil unions in Vermont
and the problem that they pose.141
1. The Potential Legalization of Same-Sex Marriages
In 1993, the supreme court of Hawaii recognized same-sex marriages
under its state constitution. 42 The court, articulating its decision in Baehr
v. Lewin,143 found that denying same-sex couples a marriage license
violated the couples' equal protection guarantee.' 4  Six plaintiffs
initiated the Baehr case.145  In Baehr, the plaintiffs had all filed
applications for marriage licenses with the Department of Health
("DOH"), a state entity. 46 DOH denied the plaintiffs' applications
because the plaintiffs were of the same sex. 147  The plaintiffs
subsequently filed a complaint against John Lewin, Director of DOH. 48
They sought injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the Hawaii
138 Martin L. Haines, Same Sex Marriage Laws are Entitled to Full Faith and Credit, 165 N.J.
L.J. 1167 (2001).
139 See infra text accompanying notes 142-60 (discussing Hawaii's recognition of same-sex
marriage under the state's equal protection clause and the subsequent amendment to
Hawaii's constitution denying recognition of same-sex marriages).
140 See infra text accompanying notes 161-72 (addressing the federal and state responses
of establishing DOMAs, claiming constitutionality under the FFCC).
141 See infra text accompanying notes 173-214 (looking at Vermont's civil union laws and
the concerns they raise for other states).
142 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In 1998, Alaska entertained a similar
discussion in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Feb. 27, 1998). In Brause, the court held that plaintiffs, a homosexual couple to
whom Alaska denied a license to marry, were protected under both the right to privacy
and equal protection provisions of the Alaska Constitution. Id. at *1. Consequently, the
court required the state to show a compelling state interest for banning same-sex marriage
under Alaska's DOMA. Id. at *6. Otherwise, the statute would be held unconstitutional.
Id. To prevent the state's DOMA from being repealed, the Alaskan legislature amended
their constitution to specifically recognize marriage as between one man and one woman.
See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (1999) ("To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage
may exist only between one man and one woman").
143 852 P.2d 44.
144 Id. at 48-49.
145 Id. at 48. Four of the plaintiffs were two female same-sex couples; the remaining two
plaintiffs were a male same-sex couple. Id.
146 Id. at 49.
147 Id.
14 Id. at 48.
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Marriage Law, in as much as it listed the requirements for marriage,
should be found unconstitutional as it permitted DOH to refuse to issue
plaintiffs marriage licenses solely based on gender.149 Such recovery,
plaintiffs alleged, violated their right to privacy, due process, and equal
protection under the Hawaii Constitution150 Subsequently, the
defendant filed an amended answer, moving for a judgment on the
pleadings because plaintiffs failed to state a claim. 15l The lower court
granted the defendant's motion.152 The plaintiffs appealed.
153
The Hawaii Supreme Court held that while Hawaii's Constitution
did not offer same-sex couples a fundamental right to marry under the
right to privacy, the Constitution might offer plaintiffs an equal
protection claim because DOH made a sex-based classification.
15 4
Because of this classification, DOH would need to show that the Hawaii
law DOH had acted under served a compelling state interest and was
narrowly drawn so as to avoid unnecessary abridgement of
constitutional rights.155 Having found that the plaintiffs had adequately
stated a claim, the court vacated the lower court's dismissal of the case
and remanded it for further proceedings.1
56
149 Id. at 48-49. Plaintiffs specifically sought to have Section 572-1 of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes as applied in their case declared unconstitutional. Id. at 48.
150 Id. at 50. Plaintiffs specifically cited Article I, Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution as
to a right to privacy, and Article I, Section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution regarding equal
protection and due process. Id.
151 Id. at 48. Defendant argued that because Hawaii's state laws recognized marriage as a
union between a man and a woman and did not penalize, infringe, or interfere with
plaintiffs' private relationships, plaintiffs had no legally recognized right to enter into a
state-licensed homosexual marriage. Id. at 51-52.
152 Id. at 52. The lower court reasoned that plaintiffs had not shown infringement on
their lifestyle decisions or oppression and political powerlessness because of that lifestyle;
that plaintiffs were not prevented from engaging in a homosexual lifestyle; and that
plaintiffs failed to show that homosexuals constitute a suspect class entitled to equal
protection. Id. at 53.
153 Id. at 52, 57. Plaintiffs alleged that the lower court had erred in refusing to recognize
homosexuals as a suspect class. Id. at 58. Plaintiffs further alleged that because of this
initial error, the lower court had also erred in declining to apply strict scrutiny to the
Hawaii statute. Id. at 58.
154 Id. at 64. The court reasoned that no right to same-sex marriage is implicit under
fundamental principles of liberty. Id. at 57. Consequently, DOH had not infringed upon
plaintiffs' right to privacy. Id.
155 Id. at 68. Under the Hawaii Constitution, laws classifying based upon suspect
categories are presumed unconstitutional unless the state can meet strict scrutiny. Id. at 64.
156 Id. at 68.
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As a result of Baehr, couples of the same sex who wished to be legally
recognized as married under Hawaii law -participants in same-sex
marriage-were constitutionally found to be able to do so. 15 7 Although
Baehr did not explicitly grant recognition to same-sex marriage, the
possibility was enough to get national attention.15 The Hawaii
legislature, concerned by the implications of Baehr on the state's
definition of marriage, amended its state constitution to reserve the
same-sex marriage issue to the legislature. 5 9 Congress had plans of its
own.
160
2. The Creation of Federal and State DOMAs
In response to Hawaii's protection of same-sex marriage under its
constitution, Congress, in 1996, passed a federal DOMA, 161 which states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship. 162
157 See generally id.
158 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (explicitly limiting marriage to a union between one man and
one woman for purposes of federal law).
159 See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998) ("The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples").
160 See infra text accompanying notes 161-64 for a discussion of this plan.
161 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). The federal DOMA was passed by a vote of 342 to sixty-
seven in the House, eighty-five to fourteen in the Senate, and signed by President Clinton
on September 21, 1996. Lynn D. Wardle, DOMA: Protecting Federalism in Family Law, 45
FED. LAW. 30, 31 (1998).
162 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. In other words, "DOMA permits states to refuse to enforce rights
arising out of the creation or dissolution of same-sex marriages." Strasser, supra note 19, at
371. The purpose of this statute is twofold. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2906 (1996). First, it
serves to protect the traditional institution of heterosexual marriage. Id. Second, it protects
the rights of the states to create their own public policy on the issue of same-sex marriage,
free of any federal implications. Id.; see also Strasser, supra note 19, at 374. Thus, it defines
marriage as between one man and one woman for the purposes of federal law only. H.R.
REP. No. 104-664, at 2906; see 1 U.S.C. § 7 ("In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress ... the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife."). Congress mentions four government interests that this
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Under this statute, Congress granted states the option of recognizing
same-sex marriages by relieving them of the obligation to do so. 163 To
date, the federal DOMA has not been constitutionally challenged. M
States, in light of the federal DOMA's permissive language
regarding same-sex marriage, established their own state DOMAs
declining to recognize same-sex marriage.165 To date, thirty-six states
statute serves: "(1) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional, heterosexual
marriage; (2) defending traditional notions of morality; (3) protecting state sovereignty and
democratic self-governance; and (4) preserving scarce government resources." H.R. REP.
No. 104-664, at 2916. While some have contended that the statute was created out of
animus against homosexuals, "moral objection to homosexual practices is not the same
thing as animus, unless all disapprovals based on morality are to be disallowed as mere
animus. Modern liberalism tends to classify all moral distinctions it does not accept as
hateful and invalid." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 113 (1996). Whether Congress was attempting "to
reaffirm the existence of a power that states already had or, instead was trying to grant
states a new power" is unclear. Mark Strasser, Mhen Is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA,
Civil Unions, and Presumptions of Parenthood, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 302 (2001) thereinafter
Strasser, Parent]. However, Congress claims to have received its power under the Effects
Clause of the FFCC, which states that "Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. CONST art. IV, § 1. Such constitutional support for the Act was necessary as
marriage is traditionally an institution controlled exclusively by the states. Shuki-Kunze,
supra note 57, at 355. See infra text accompanying 235-87 for analysis of this constitutional
support.
163 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. Interestingly, no state had ever licensed a same-sex marriage when
the DOMA was drafted. Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of
Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 255, 270 n.67 (2002). The
only "threat" in sight was the civil union, which only Vermont recognizes but which did
not exist when the federal DOMA was passed. Id.
164 Strasser, supra note 19, at 364. Further, "[flew of the Supreme Court's past opinions
shed much light on DOMA's compliance (or lack thereof) with the [FFCC]." Kelly, supra
note 33, at 211. Some scholars argue that DOMA cannot be tested because to have standing
in federal court, a plaintiff must violate the statute. See, e.g., Brett P. Ryan, Love and Let
Love: Same-Sex Marriage, Past, Present, and Future, and the Constitutionality of DOMA, 22 U.
HAW. L .REV. 185, 224 n.280 (2000). This can only be done through entering into a same-sex
marriage, which is not an available option in this country. Id. Only civil unions are
currently available. Ross, supra note 163, at 270 n.67.
165 Strasser, Parent, supra note 162, at 307. Specifically, state legislatures were concerned
about same-sex couples traveling to Hawaii to get married or enter into a civil union,
returning home, and expecting their home state to honor such marriages or unions. Shuki-
Kunze, supra note 57, at 355. Over thirty states introduced legislation in response to the
"threat" of Hawaii's same-sex marriage law. Id. For a citation of each state's DOMA, see
Wardle, supra note 49, at 239 app. II. Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada have
incorporated DOMA into their state constitutions. Liberty Counsel, United States Laws
Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriages, available at http://www.lc.org/ProFamily/DOMAs.html
(last updated Mar. 11, 2004).
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have enacted state DOMAs. 166 Such state DOMAs directly implement
the federal DOMA.167 Georgia, for example, uses language similar to
that of the federal DOMA and provides in its DOMA that "Ja]ny
marriage entered into by persons of the same sex pursuant to a marriage
license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall
be void in this state."' 6s State DOMAs all prohibit recognition of same-
sex marriages granted in other jurisdictions in varying degrees. 69 Some
166 Liberty Counsel, United States Laws Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriages, available at
http://www.lc.org/ProFanily/DOMAs.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2004). The fourteen
states which have not adopted DOMAs are: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Nevada, on its November 2002 ballot, ratified a
constitutional amendment limiting marriage to the union of one man and one woman.
Scott Sonner, Republicans Nearly Sweep Nevada; Pot Loses; Anti-Gays Win; Berkely Only
Democratic Win (Nov. 5, 2002), available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/
nevada/2002/nov/05/10510489.html. Connecticut is currently engaged in a drive
petitioning its legislators to enact a DOMA. Brian Brown, Family Institute of Connecticut
Sponsor Rally for Marriage on Capitol Steps January 29th: Over 500 Supporters of Traditional
Marriage Expected (Jan. 28, 2003), at http://www.ctfanily.org (on file with Valparaiso
University Law Review). Similarly, Texas has a bill before its legislature banning the
recognition of and denying any legal rights to both same-sex marriages and civil unions.
Janet Elliot and Clay Robison, Bill Attempts to Ban Same-Sex Marriages (Nov. 13, 2002),
available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/front/1659379 (on file with
Valparaiso University Law Review). A recent attempt at amending the Massachusetts state
constitution to ban same-sex marriage was made through the Protection of Marriage
Amendment, but failed. Michael J. Meade, Bid to Ban Gay Marriage Fails (Dec. 31, 2002), at
http://www.365gay.com/NewsContent/123102massmarriage.htm (on file with
Valparaiso University Law Review). Proponents of the amendment are seeking to
reintroduce the issue as a DOMA bill in 2006. Id.
167 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101(c) (West 2000) ("Marriage between persons of the
same sex is void and prohibited."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(d) (1999) ("A marriage
obtained or recognized outside the State between persons [of the same gender] shall not
constitute a legal or valid marriage within the State."); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(b) (1996)
("It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the union only of man and
woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state."); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1995) ("The marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil
contract between two parties who are of opposite sex. All other marriages are declared to
be contrary to the public policy of this state and are void."); MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (1997)
("Lawful marriage may be contracted only between persons of the opposite sex."); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (1998) ("Marriages in the following cases are prohibited: .... When
the parties are persons other than a male and a female.").
168 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(b) (2000).
169 Compare ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (1975) ("The State of Alabama shall not recognize as
valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred
as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was
issued."), With ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013(a) (Michie Supp. 2000) ("A marriage entered into
by persons of the same sex, either under common law or under statute, that is recognized
by another state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state, and contractual rights granted
by virtue of the marriage, including its termination, are unenforceable in this state."); ARK.
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DOMAs serve as a refusal to recognize a same-sex marriage validly
granted elsewhere. 170 Others deny not only recognition, but also rights
arising out of such a marriage.171 Still, other DOMAs more broadly
refuse to recognize relationships that are legally treated like same-sex
marriages and further deny any rights such relationships might have. 7 2
CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(c) (Michie 1998) ("Any marriage entered into by persons of the same
sex, where a marriage license is issued by another state or by a foreign jurisdiction, shall be
void in Arkansas and any contractual or other rights granted by virtue of that license,
including its termination, shall be unenforceable in the Arkansas courts.").
170 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (stating that "[tihe state of Alabama shall not
recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to
have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage
license was issued"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101(c) (stating that "[miarriage between persons
of the same sex is void and prohibited" and that, pursuant to section 25-112(a),
"[m]arriages valid by the laws of the place where contracted are valid in this state, except
marriages that are void and prohibited by § 25-101"); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1(b) (1998)
(stating that "[a] marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana even if
the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized"). Other states, including Idaho,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington have similar
DOMAs. See Strasser, Parent, supra note 162, at 324 n.28.
171 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(c). Arkansas' DOMA provides:
Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, where a
marriage license is issued by another state or by a foreign jurisdiction,
shall be void in Arkansas and any contractual or other rights granted
by virtue of that license, including its termination, shall be
unenforceable in the Arkansas courts.
Id. Similarly, Georgia's DOMA states:
No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as
entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by
person of the same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by
another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this
state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of such license shall be
unenforceable in the courts of this state and the courts of this state
shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to
grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such marriage
or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights
arising as a result of or in connection to such marriage.
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(b). Other states, such as Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, and
Virginia, have similar provisions in their DOMAs. See Strasser, Parent, supra note 162, at
324 n.29.
172 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §25.05.013(a) (stating that "[a] marriage entered into by
persons of the same sex, either under common law or under statute, that is recognized by
another state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state, and contractual rights granted by
virtue of the marriage, including its termination, are unenforceable in this state"). Florida's
DOMA reads similarly:
(1) Marriages between persons of the same sex entered into in any
jurisdiction, whether within or outside the State of Florida, the United
States, or any other jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any
other place or location, or relationships between persons of the same
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However, only the latter type of DOMA anticipated any attempts to
outmaneuver the DOMA, which Vermont later tried.
3. Vermont's Civil Unions and the Issue They Raise Under DOMA
Subsequent to the passage of the federal and many state DOMAs, the
Vermont Supreme Court affirmed protection of same-sex couples under
the state constitution and required the state to draft a statute
accordingly. 173 Specifically, the court held that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from benefits and protections that are incident of Vermont's
marriage laws violated the common benefits clause of Vermont's
sex which are treated as marriages in any jurisdiction, whether within
or outside the State of Florida, the United States, or any other
jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place or location,
are not recognized for any purpose in this state ....
(2) The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions may not give
effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any state,
territory, possession, or tribe of the United States or of any other
jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place or location
respecting either a marriage or relationship not recognized under
subsection (1) or a claim arising from such a marriage or relationship.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(1), (2) (West Supp. 2003). West Virginia has a similar language
in its DOMA. See Strasser, Parent, supra note 162, at 324 n.30.
173 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Similarly, in the more recent decision of
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court mandated a similar statute. Specifically, the Court reasonsed that because
the state's marriage licensing statute did not define "marriage," the definition must be
derived from the legislature's intent to use the common law meaning of the term when
drafting the statute, that of the union between one man and one woman. Id. at 952-53.
While the legislature was exercising its constitutionally granted police power to create this
statute, it must demonstrate that the statute was not an arbitrary and capricious use of that
police power for it to be deemed constitutional. Id. at 954, 960. To satisfy this standard, the
Court stated that the law must have a rational basis for its creation, namely, the statute
must "bear a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other
phase of the general welfare." Id. at 960. Because the statute did not further the state's
interest in either providing a favorable setting for procreation or ensuring an optimal
setting for child-rearing, the Court held that the statute lacked rational basis and violated
the state constitution's equal protection privileges. Id. at 961-64. Thus, the Court deemed
the statute unconstitutional and reformulated the language of the statute to define
marriage to mean "the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all
others," borrowing the language from a case handed down by the Canadian province of
Ontario's Supreme Court and thereby recognizing same-sex marriage in the state of
Massachusetts. Id. at 969. New Jersey is headed in the same direction with its Senate
passing a bill providing benefits to same-sex couples, which the governor is expected to
sign. Concerned Women for America, New Jersey Senator "Pulled a Fast One" on Citizens,
CWA's Rios Says (Jan. 9, 2004), at http://www.cwfa.org/articles/5076/MEDIA/family/
index.htm.
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Constitution.174 Because same-sex couples were entitled to legal benefits
and protection, the court required the Vermont legislature to create a
statutory scheme that would provide same-sex partners with "all or most
of the same rights and obligations provided by the law to married
partners," the nature of which was left to the legislature.175 In response
to the Vermont Supreme Court's mandate, the Vermont legislature chose
to create the civil union. 176
174 Baker, 744 A.2d at 889 ("The extension of the Common Benefits Clause to acknowledge
plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less, than legal protection and
security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human relationship
175 Id. at 886.
176 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2000). Vermont passed legislation granting recognition
of civil unions, which offer similar benefits as those bestowed upon heterosexual married
couples. Id. Four other states are working to legalize same-sex couples. First, Colorado is
currently considering recognizing same-sex couples legally. Michael A. de Yoanna, Bill
Calls for Gay Civil Unions (Jan. 12, 2003), at http://www.coloradodaily.com/articles/2003/
01/12/export7219.txt (on file with Valparaiso University Law Review). Though this
recognition falls short of marriage, it permits same-sex couples recognition for the purposes
of benefits, inheritance, and adoption, as well as many other benefits married couples
enjoy. Id. Second, Connecticut is moving towards the legalization of same-sex marriages.
Susan Haigh, Efforts Resume to Enact Same-Sex Marriage Law (Nov. 21, 2002), at
http://www.ctnow.com/news/local/nc-apsamesexll2l.artnov.21.story (on file with
Valparaiso University Law Review). Proponents of this legalization prefer same-sex
marriage over civil unions as they are more likely to be recognized by other states. Id.
These proponents have also requested the General Assembly's Judiciary Committee to
conduct a study regarding the impact of permitting same-sex marriages. Brian S. Brown, A
Victory for Marriage (Jan. 9, 2003), at http://www.ctfamily.org/updates.html (on file with
Valparaiso University Law Review). The Committee did so without issuing any
recommendations in light of the findings in the report. Id. The Catholic Church of
Connecticut has expressed direct opposition to any such legislation recognizing same-sex
unions. John Zorabedian, City Church Considers Resolution Supporting Same-Sex Unions (Jan.
19, 2003), at http://www.middletownpress.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=6744071&BRD =
1645&PAG. Third, in Massachusetts, a case is pending before the state supreme court
involving seven same-sex couples seeking to marry. Lawrence Morahan, Civil Rights, Legal
Groups Voice Support of Same-Sex Marriage (Nov. 25, 2002), at http://www.cnsnews.com/
Culture/Archive/200211/CUL20021125c.html. Those following the case predict that the
court is likely to legalize same-sex marriage. Stanley Kurtz, The Coming Battle, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE, Nov. 26, 2002, at http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtzll2602.asp. Other
states, such as Utah, have filed amicus briefs urging Massachusetts not to recognize the
marriage as it will require other states to do so as well. Lisa Riley Roche, 400 Decry Proposal
to Ban Same-Sex Marriage (Jan. 25, 2003), at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/
0,1249,455027520,00.html. Last, in New Jersey, a case is pending in which seven couples
are seeking to have their unions recognized as marriages. Reginald Roberts, Their Goal:
Same-Sex Unions (Jan. 23, 2003), at http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/
base/news-3/104330598424810.xml (on file with Valparaiso University Law Review).
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When Vermont passed its bill granting legal recognition to civil
unions, it was precise in stating that civil unions were not to be treated as
marriages under the law.177 The Vermont legislature made it clear that
civil unions were not marriages because marriages required the union of
a man and a woman. 7 8 Civil unions, conversely, were created for the
exclusive use of same-sex couples.179 Although the Vermont legislature
had the option of legalizing same-sex marriages, it chose to create the
civil union, a separate entity with separate treatment, rights, and
responsibilities under the law, because the Vermont legislature knew of
both federal and state DOMAs addressing the recognition of same-sex
marriages and hoped to circumvent their impact.180 Recent legislative
activity to amend the Vermont Constitution to deny recognition to same-
sex marriages further cements this distinction. 181 It is in states that have
passed DOMAs that specifically refuse recognition of same-sex
marriages that civil unions become problematic. Whether these DOMAs
should apply to Vermont's civil union is currently uncertain.182
177 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202(2). In fact, several different types of partnerships exist:
the domestic partnership, the civil union, and marriages. Strasser, supra note 19, at 363.
"Each has its own benefits and drawbacks," but comparison between the two is difficult
because the benefits and drawbacks of each are different, including symbolic and material
benefits. Id. For a detailed discussion on the differences between the three, see generally
id.
178 VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 1201(4) ("'Marriage' means the legally recognized union of
one man and one woman.").
179 Id. § 1202 ("For a civil union to be established in Vermont, it shall be necessary that the
parties .... Be of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this
state."). Most scholars argue that "civil unions law ... does not 'bestow the status of civil
marriage' on same-sex couples." Eskridge, supra note 135, at 859. See, e.g., Johnson, supra
note 3, at 339. Some scholars do, however, make a "separate but equal" argument, stating
that marriages and civil unions are treated similarly, with all the same benefits and the
same dissolution proceedings. Id. at 321. Thus, while civil unions are not marriage, they
are quasi-marital in nature, mimicking a "super" domestic partnership, but enjoying all the
privileges and rights of marriage. Silverman, supra note 100, at 1100. Of note is that
dissolution proceedings are not always granted by many other states because such states
do not recognize civil unions. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
180 Eskridge, supra note 135, at 859. This decision may also have been intended to
"provide due respect for tradition and long-standing social institutions." Id. Some scholars
believe that this compromise undermines liberal principles as it bends to the will of more
traditionally-oriented constituents. Id. However, other scholars think that the creation of
the civil union was intended to demonstrate that marriage is not the only relationship that
can have legal and social rights and benefits. See Cox, supra note 19, at 121.
181 Ross Sneyd, Senator Wants Amendment Against Same-Sex Marriage, TIMES ARGUS (Vt.),
Feb, 7, 2003, available at http://timesargus.nybor.com/local/Story/60305.html.
182 So far, only Georgia has spoken on the issue and has refrained from applying its
DOMA to civil unions. See generally Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 47.
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As of yet, no state has denied civil unions recognition using its state
DOMA.183 Instead, states have reinforced Vermont's distinction between
civil unions and marriages.184 For example, in Burns v. Burns,185 a suit
was brought in Georgia concerning visitation rights of an ex-wife who
had subsequently entered into a civil union in Vermont, receiving a
"LICENSE AND CERTIFICATE OF CIVIL UNION." 186 The visitation
agreement stipulated that the ex-wife would be granted visitation rights
to her child so long as she was not cohabitating with another adult to
whom she was not legally married. 87 In light of her cohabitation, the
child's father filed a motion for contempt and requested that the
plaintiff's visitation rights be revoked because she had breached the
agreement. 188  In response, the plaintiff argued that civil unions
constitute marriage and thus, she did not violate the visitation
agreement.189 Further, she claimed that she should be granted full faith
and credit for her civil union because it was a marriage.190
The Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, disagreed, stating
that because civil unions are not marriages, the plaintiff's civil union
violated the visitation agreement.191 The court cited Vermont's civil
union statute to support this determination, noting that the statute
explicitly distinguishes between marriages and civil unions.192 The court
further stated that even if the plaintiff's civil union was recognized as a
marriage under Vermont law, the court still would not recognize it as
such because, pursuant to Georgia's DOMA, 193 Georgia would not
183 See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Burns, 560 S.E.2d
47.
184 See Rosengarten, 802 A.2d 170 (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a
civil union because the court only had jurisdiction to hear domestic relation matters; the
court lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a civil union because civil unions are excluded from
Vermont's marriage law); Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48 (stating that plaintiff had not been
married in Vermont, but had instead entered into a civil union).
185 560 S.E.2d 47.
186 Id. at 48. Plaintiff traveled with her partner to Vermont two days after the civil union
laws were enacted. Id.
187 Id. This visitation provision was the result of plaintiff's motion for contempt against
defendant, alleging that defendant was not allowing her to visit her children. Id. The court
issued a consent form modifying visitation rights to those described above. Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. Neither party contested the enforceability of the consent decree. Id.
190 Id. Plaintiff also argued that her fundamental right to privacy had been violated as
she had a right to define her own family. Id. She further argued that Georgia could not
limit that right. Id.
191 Id. at 49.
192 Id. at 48.
193 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996).
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recognize same-sex marriages. 94 Thus, regardless of how the plaintiff's
civil union was construed, the court held that the plaintiff violated the
visitation agreement when she cohabitated with another woman. 1
95
Through this decision, the court articulated an important point: civil
unions would not be subject to state DOMAs.
Because of the newness of civil unions, only one non-DOMA state
has had to rely on its own common law to refuse to recognize civil
unions.196 In July 2002, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed a
lower court decision to decline to dissolve a civil union because it lacked
jurisdiction. 197 In Rosengarten v. Downes,198 the plaintiff and defendant
were joined in a civil union on December 21, 2000, in Vermont.99
Subsequently, the union broke down, and the plaintiff moved to
Connecticut. 20 0 The plaintiff had lived in Connecticut for one year before
commencing these proceedings to dissolve his civil union.20 1 The trial
court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating
that it could only handle family relations matters, which civil unions are
not.20 2 The Connecticut court agreed with the lower court's finding,
citing language from Vermont's civil union statute that clearly excludes
civil unions from its marriage laws.20 3 Further, the court found that the
FFCC did not mandate that it recognize the plaintiff's civil union.
Because the plaintiff had sufficient contacts with Connecticut,
Connecticut had greater interest in this case than Vermont. 204 As a
result, Connecticut's law and public policies applied. 2 5 Connecticut's
public policy consistently demonstrated that it had no interest in legally
recognizing same-sex marriages, nor civil unions.206 Because civil unions
were contrary to Connecticut's public policy, the court held that it did
194 Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 49.
195 Id. at 49.
196 See Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 184 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
197 Id. The lower court reasoned that "the Vermont legislature cannot legislate for the
people of Connecticut [whether civil unions should be recognized]." Id. at 178.
198 802 A.2d 170.
199 Id. at 172.
200 Id.
201 Id. Plaintiff claimed the court could hear his case because it involved family relations,
over which the court had jurisdiction. Id. at 174.
202 Id. at 175.
203 Id. at 173.
204 Id. at 178-79.
205 Id. at 178. For more discussion on the contacts test under the FFCC, see supra text
accompanying notes 116-19.
206 Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 179 n.6.
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not have to offer the plaintiff's civil union full faith and credit.20 7
Consequently, it dismissed the case.20 8
As Rosengarten demonstrates, public policy can be used in
determining recognition of civil unions.2°9 But, this should not be a
state's only option. After all, as to judgments, a state court may only use
public policy if the parties have sufficient contacts with, or are domiciled
in, that state. 210 But, as the Burns court states, DOMA should not be
applied to civil unions.211 If this is the case, states have little recourse
against "marriage" laws of other states. Perhaps DOMAs should be
construed to include civil unions.212 However, their language does not
appear to include civil unions. 213  Further, DOMAs also raise
constitutional concerns under the FFCC because they appear to limit the
FFCC. 214 It is these dilemmas of constitutionality and applicability that
this Note now addresses.
III. ANALYSIS
The problems that surround applying DOMAs to civil unions in
light of the FFCC are significant. Not only is it uncertain whether such
statutes are constitutional, it is also uncertain whether the states can
properly apply them to civil unions.215 In light of this, Part A of this
207 Id. at 179.
208 Id. at 184. Mr. Rosengarten appealed this decision, but before the Connecticut
Supreme Court could hear the case, Mr. Rosengarten died. Mathew Stayer, Case Seeking to
Establish Civil Unions in Connecticut Dirnissed Due to Death of the Plaintiff (Jan. 28, 2003), at
http://www.lc.org/pressrelease/2003/nrO12803.htm. After placing the case on hold for a
time, the Connecticut Supreme Court dismissed the case. Id.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 198-208 for a discussion of the Rosengarten court's
use of Connecticut's public policy.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 80-84 (explaining that a state court may use a
public policy exception when deciding whether to recognize another state's law only if the
parties involved are domiciled in that state).
211 See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
212 See infra Part.llI.B (analyzing why construing DOMA to include civil unions is
inappropriate).
213 See supra notes 169-72 for the express language of state DOMAs.
214 See infra Part.IIl.A (determining that DOMAs are a constitutional use of both state and
federal power).
215 A more fundamental and basic question is that of worldview and understanding of
truth. Leonard G. Brown 1Il, Constitutionally Defending Marriage: The Defense of Marriage
Act, Romer v. Evans and the Cultural Battle They Represent, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 159, 160
(1996) (citing Francis A. Schaeffer, How Should We Then Live?, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER 5 (1982)). The view of truth that judges and legislators have will
determine the outcome of deciding cases and implementing statutes, respectively. Id. For
further discussion of this preliminary question, see id.
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analysis looks at the constitutionality of the DOMA in the context of
Congress's role under the FFCC, the federal DOMA, and state
DOMAs.2 6 Part B addresses the appropriateness of the application of
such DOMAs to civil unions.217 Finally, Part C addresses policy concerns
that arise in denying civil unions recognition. 218
A. The Constitutionality of DOMAs Under the FFCC
The implementing of both state and federal DOMAs raises
considerable constitutional concerns under the FFCC.219  First, the
constitutionality of whether Congress has the power and the extent of
that power to pass the federal DOMA is in question. Whether the states
can utilize the power Congress defers to them without violating the
FFCC is another concern. This Note addresses each in turn. Part 1
216 See infra text accompanying notes 219-314 (finding that both federal and state DOMAs
are constitutional under the language and historical interpretation of the FFCC).
217 See infra text accompanying notes 315-32 (determining that DOMAs, as they currently
stand, cannot properly be interpreted to include civil unions).
218 See infra Part III.C (discussing the possible benefits lost to those in civil unions if
DOMAs are amended to include civil unions).
219 See generally Whitten, supra note 16. DOMA raises other constitutional issues as well,
including privileges and immunities guarantees, due process guarantees, equal protection
guarantees, and First Amendment freedom of expression issues. For a further discussion of
DOMA in light of privileges and immunities, see generally Mark Strasser, The Privileges of
National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and the Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERS L. REV.
553 (2000). For analysis of DOMA's relationship to the due process and equal protection
guarantees, see generally Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great,
Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 921, 986 (1995). For an exploration of the First Amendment's impact on
DOMA, see generally David Cruz, Just Don't Call It Marriage: The First Amendment and
Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 CAL. L. REV. 925 (2000). All of these constitutional
concerns, including that of the FFCC, are sought to be eliminated under the proposed
Federal Marriage Amendment, which would state that marriage is only available to
couples comprised of one man and one woman. Brooke Adams, Gay Community Prepares to
Fight Marriage Amendment, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 16, 2003, available at
http://www.sltrib.com/2003/lan/01162003/utah/20627.asp. Arguably, the Amendment
is aimed at a nonexistent target, as same-sex marriage is not recognized among the fifty
states, with Vermont the only state to recognize anything close to same-sex marriage in its
civil union laws. Id. Others argue that this issue has been and should continue to be one
for the states to determine. Lisa Riley Roche, 400 Decry Proposal to Ban Same-Sex Marriage
(Jan. 25, 2003), at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,455027520,00.htm. A total of
thirty-eight states are needed to ratify the bill. Joyce Howard Price, Nevada OKs
Constitutional Amendment on Marriage (Nov. 7, 2002), available at http://www.washtimes.
com/national/20021107-3506359.htm (on file with Valparaiso University Law Review).
Currently, thirty-six states have DOMAs in place. See Liberty Counsel, United States Laws
Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriages, available at http://www.lc.org/ProFamily/DOMAs.html
(last updated Mar. 11, 2004).
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determines the nature of Congress' role in applying the FFCC.220 Part 2
analyzes full faith and credit issues that the federal DOMA raises.221
Finally, Part 3 evaluates state DOMAs in light of the FFCC.222
1. Congress' Role and the FFCC: Procedural or Substantive?
Essential to determining whether the DOMAs enacted on both the
state and federal level are constitutional is addressing what role
Congress plays in implementing the FFCC. 223 Clearly, Congress does
play a part in enforcing the FFCC as the FFCC itself states that "Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."224 However, a
tension in determining the nature of Congress' role in the application of
the FFCC arises out of this very language. 225 Specifically, while the first
part of the FFCC grants full faith and credit of authenticated acts,
records, and judgments, the second part permits Congress to determine
just what effect those acts, records, and judgments should take.226
Congress may have one of two types of "effects" power under the
FFCC: a procedural one or a substantive one.227 A procedural effect
would permit Congress to determine the nature of the effect an act,
record, or judgment might have on a state court's decision. 22 Under this
approach, Congress must grant conclusive effect to all acts, records, and
judgments. 229 However, Congress is permitted to determine how the
220 See infra text accompanying notes 223-59 (arguing that Congress' role under the FFCC
is substantive from a historical perspective).
221 See infra text accompanying notes 260-87 (demonstrating that the federal DOMA is
constitutional under the language and historical context of the FFCC).
222 See infra text accompanying notes 288-314 (showing the constitutionality of the state
DOMAs under the FFCC's implicit incorporation of the conflict-of-laws doctrine).
M2 If Congress has the power to establish the parameters of the FFCC, then a statute such
as the DOMA would not be problematic. However, if Congress' power is limited to merely
a procedural implementing of the FFCC, DOMA overreaches. See infra notes 227-59 and
accompanying text.
224 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
225 See Strasser, supra note 16, at 308-09.
226 See id. The language of Article I, Section 4, states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
227 Timothy Joseph Keefer, DOMA as a Defensible Exercise of Congressional Power Under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1635, 1655-56 (1997).
228 See Strasser, supra note 16, at 310.
2N Id. at 311. Such a view historically has been dismissed because it requires a state to
examine the effect of a judgment in the state where it was rendered and could possibly
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 [2004], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss4/7
2004] Civil Unions 1545
recognition of those acts, records, and judgments should be done.230 For
example, Congress could set up a system in which a new trial in a sister
state would be deemed inappropriate because of a previous judgment on
the issue in the forum state. 231  Such a decision would promote
efficiency in the administration of the FFCC among states.232 But,
Congress could not set up such a system if no previous judgment was
involved. Thus, Congress could determine what kind of an effect a
judgment would have among the states.233 But, it could not determine
whether or not the judgment should have any effect.234
However, if Congress could decide the substantive effect of acts,
records, or judgments among the states, it would be permitted to decide
which acts, records, or judgments have any effect among the states and
which do not. 235 For example, if Congress passed legislation that stated
that no state should recognize divorces granted in another state,
Congress would be affecting the substance of the judgments involved.
Thus, if Congress' role was substantive, it would be constitutionally
permissible for it to deny effect to any judgment it so chose. 23 6
Determining which of these is an appropriate understanding of
Congress' role under the FFCC is crucial to determining the
constitutionality of DOMAs. DOMAs substantively affect the validity of
same-sex marriages. 237 If Congress' role is procedural, then DOMAs are
inherently unconstitutional because Congress may only determine the
type of effect same-sex marriages might have.238 Conversely, if
Congress' role is substantive, DOMA overcomes this preliminary
result in a judgment having greater effect than it would have in the state in which the
judgment is in question. Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Cai. R. 460, 484 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803). It is
likely that this view was adopted through the misinterpretation of precedent which
appeared to be interpreting the first sentence of the FFCC but was actually interpreting a
different implementing statute that mimicked the FFCC in language. See Mills v. Duryee,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813), cited in Borchers, supra note 7, at 158.
23 See Whitten, supra note 16, at 311.
231 See Strasser, supra note 16, at 310-11.
232 See id. at 311.
233 Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional
Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1452 (1997).
234 Id. at 1452-53.
235 See Strasser, supra note 16, at 311.
2M Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense
of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604, 623 (1997).
237 Id. at 630.
238 Id. at 624-25.
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problem as Congress is permitted to establish which acts, records, or
judgments are valid.
The Supreme Court has not addressed which type of effect Congress
may give to acts, records, and judicial proceedings in any clear, decisive
manner.239 The most the Court has said on the issue is that full credit
must be given.2 40 Beyond that, however, the Supreme Court offers little
guidance. Thus, whether Congress may govern the effect of judgments,
records, and judicial proceedings in a procedural manner or in a
substantive manner is ambiguous at best. Yet, this fundamental question
must be resolved.
The argument for Congress' role as procedural relies on several
assumptions. First, because some exceptions to the FFCC should be
permitted, 241 this argument assumes that the FFCC must have been
drafted to comply with "enforcement of other states' statutes . . . in
accord with a set of conflict-of-laws and jurisdictional rules not explicitly
specified in the text of the [FFCC]."242 This assumption, however, yields
another problem regarding the second sentence of the FFCC. Conflict-
of-laws doctrine limits Congress' ability to determine the effect of
judgments among states.243 To explain this limitation, scholars limit
Congress' role to that of a procedural one, that is, one of determining the
"technical rules for authenticating the statutes of other states." 244 Thus,
this argument arrives at the conclusion that Congress' role under the
119 Strasser, supra note 16, at 309. Strasser argues that the power to proscribe would
nullify the FFCC and consequently, render it moot. MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 137 (1997). Consequently, Congress' role in
implementing the FFCC must be a procedural one. Id.
240 See Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
241 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause,
without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd
result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must
be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.
Id.; see also Whitten, supra note 16, at 261. If no exception could be made, states would be
forced to use out-of-state laws in its own decision making and, in cases involving more
than one state, would have to make impossible decisions regarding which states' law to
apply. Borchers, supra note 7, at 159.
242 Whitten, supra note 16, at 261.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 262. An alternative interpretation would be to assume Congress can override
any effect the conflict-of-law doctrine might have via the first sentence of the FFCC. Id.
However, because such an interpretation of the Effects Clause is contrary to the usual
understanding of the relationship between Congress and the courts, this alternative is
typically dismissed. Id.
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FFCC is procedural merely because it wants to ensure that its
assumptions made under the FFCC are true.
The better argument is that Congress' role is substantive. Rather
than relying on assumptions, this argument instead looks to the context
of the FFCC's drafting.245 Under this historical analysis of each sentence
of the FFCC, it becomes clear that Congress was intended to have a
substantive role. The first sentence of the FFCC requires that "Full Faith
and Credit" be given among the states.246 Historically, this meant that
other states' statutes were to be considered "good" or "admissible"
evidence in another state. 247 Thus, "faith" and "credit" in relation to
state laws are understood as evidentiary terms, rather than words giving
other states' laws conclusive effect. 248
"Full faith and credit" can mean one of two things. It can mean
conclusive as to authentication (supporting the existence and contents of
itself), or it can mean conclusive on the merits (res judicata).249 Historical
245 See Kelly, supra note 33, at 209-10 (stating that "debating semantics alone ignores the
constitutional history of the [FFCC]. A proper analysis entails reviewing how the
Constitution's Framers, the U.S. Supreme Court and the states themselves have interpreted
the [FFCC]"); Whitten, supra note 16, at 258-59. Though many scholars turn to history for
FFCC analysis, modem commentary on the meaning of the FFCC "can only be described as
'political,' rather than scholarly, and it certainly does not amount in any way to a
competent or objective attempt to examine the historical evidence about the meaning of the
Clause." Id. at 347. Even Justice Scalia, who purportedly looks to history for guidance in
evaluating the Constitution, stated that "lt]he conflicts law embodied in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause allows room for common-law development." Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717, 723 n.1 (1988). For an in depth discussion on the weaknesses of current historical
and theoretical analysis of the FFCC, see Whitten, supra note 16, at 346-90.
246 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
247 See Whitten, supra note 16, at 263. In other words, a statute can be authenticated by
rules not explicitly in the Constitution so as to prove "conclusive proof that the statutes
exist and deal with the matters described in their text." Id. at 264. The evidentiary origins
of the terms "faith" and "credit" can be traced back to English law and ultimately to the
middle ages. Id. at 266 n.24. Under English law, these terms were very flexible, applying to
the mere admission of evidence or to the weight or effect such evidence should have. Id. at
267. It came out of a need for authentication and proof of foreign law where such law was
applied in English courts. Id. at 272.
24s See James v. Allen, 1 U.S. (1 Dall) 188, 192 (1786). This distinction between
authentication rather than conclusive effect is significant, as proof of a law (authentication)
did not dictate that such a law necessarily govern the outcome of the case at hand.
Whitten, supra note 16, at 273. The understanding of the FFCC as a evidentiary clause may
seem to be trivial, but the importance of the issue to us is irrelevant when seeking a
historical understanding of the clause. Id. at 264.
249 See Whitten, supra note 16, at 267-68. Thus, if a document was given full faith and
credit, the decree could not be impeached by putting on new evidence. Borchers, supra
note 7, at 158.
Woudenberg: Giving DOMA Some Credit: The Validity of Applying Defense of Marr
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
1548 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.38
documents indicate that the drafters of the FFCC intended the former to
be the appropriate understanding and application of the FFCC.250 Such a
constitutional provision regarding acts, public records, and judgments
was necessary to ensure that the provision did not "amount to nothing
more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations." 25'
Thus, the first sentence of the FFCC was intended to demand that acts,
public records, and judgments were conclusive as to authentication.
The second sentence of the FFCC was intended to allow Congress to
determine the manner and effect of such authentication.
252
Determinations regarding acts, public records, and judgments are
reserved exclusively for Congress. 253  Under this exclusive power,
Congress may "'limit the effect of judicial proceedings' under the
Clause." 254 Congress must do so in the form of a "general law." 255 The
word "general" was historically used to indicate that a legislating body
could not legislate with reference to or with a particular case in mind.
25 6
For example, Congress could not pass a bill addressing the outcome of a
pending case. Providing it did not do so, Congress could
constitutionally pass limitations as to the effects of acts, public records,
and judgments. However, if Congress did not pass a general law on a
250 See generally MAX FARRAND, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
(rev. 3d ed. 1966). For example, Wilson and Johnson saw state judgments only as grounds
of action, rather than having a conclusive effect on the merits. Id. at 447 (Madison's notes).
A shift from conclusive as to authentication to conclusive on the merits occurred in Mills v.
Dundee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813), when the Supreme Court adopted a more expansive
view. Borchers, supra note 7, at 158.
251 FARRAND, supra note 250, at 488.
252 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
253 See id.
254 Whitten, supra note 16, at 302 (citing Green v. Sarmiento, 10 F. Cas. 1117, 1118 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1810) (No. 5,760)).
255 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
256 Whitten, supra note 16, at 388. This understanding of "general laws" was the source of
the due process prohibition on retroactive laws. Id. However, some historical scholars
hold that the term "general" is used in contrast to "local." See Defense of Marriage Act:
Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judicary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 42, 57 (1996)
(statement of Michael W. McConnell); see, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842)
(determining that the meaning of the 'general commercial law' was to be done in contrast
with 'local' laws). Such an interpretation may, however, be erroneous as the "'general'
versus 'local' distinction was only used to communicate a difference in sources of
applicable substantive law." Whitten, supra note 16, at 388 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954)).
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particular issue, the states could determine what constitutes appropriate
authentication. 257
This historical view clearly supports Congress' role as substantive in
implementing the FFCC. Congress is permitted to determine the effect
of acts, public records, and judgments among states, provided it does so
in a general fashion.25 8 Having thus analyzed this preliminary question,
this Note now addresses the federal and state DOMAs'
constitutionality.259
2. The Constitutionality of the Federal DOMA
Because Congress has a substantive role in implementing the FFCC,
DOMA could not possibly be undermining the FFCC. First, to qualify
for consideration under the FFCC, DOMA must address an act, public
record, or judgment.260 Marriage, whether between couples of the same
sex or opposite sex, does not constitute a judgment for the purposes of
the FFCC.261 A judgment involves a controversy that the courts must
resolve and enforce.262  For example, a divorce is considered a
judgment-it involves a controversy and a court must enforce it.
Marriage, on the other hand, does not constitute a controversy, as both
parties must assent and be in agreement for such a union to take place.
The state's only involvement with a marriage is issuing a marriage
certificate. 263 Consequently, DOMA does not affect a judgment.
DOMA does, however, affect a public record. Marriage certificates
are evidence of a public record. Marriage documentation is kept on
record and is available to the public.264 Consequently, marriage falls
under the language of the FFCC as a public record. The first sentence of
the FFCC historically was intended to deal with the evidentiary effect,
257 See id. at 264. Typically, this takes the form of choice-of-law and conflict-of-law
doctrine. Id. at 265. For a further discussion on the choice-of law element of the FFCC, see
supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
258 See U.S CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
259 See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of the federal DOMA's constitutionality in a
historical context.
260 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
261 See Borchers, supra note 7, at 165-66. If they were, fishing and driving licenses would
need to be recognized as judgments as well. Id. at 167.
262 Kelly, supra note 33, at 217.
263 Id. at 216.
264 See Thomas v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1990).
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not the validity of a document. 265 The federal DOMA seems to comply
with this requirement. The federal DOMA asserts that states are not
required to recognize same-sex marriages performed in another state.
266
This does not mean that those marriages will have no legal weight;
rather, it means that courts do not need to enforce them.267 Thus,
marriage certificates demonstrating that a same-sex couple was married
can serve as conclusive proof that the individuals in question were
indeed married. But, such proof does not require a state to recognize
that marriage as valid. 268  The FFCC stipulates nothing regarding
validity. 269 Thus, because the first sentence of the FFCC deals with
evidentiary effect, Congress' enactment of DOMA, which speaks to
validity, not authenticity, satisfies the initial requirements of the FFCC.
Having survived the first sentence of the FFCC, the federal DOMA
still must face the latter part of the FFCC. The second sentence permits
Congress to pass "general laws" regarding the manner in which
judgments and proceedings are proved.270 True, DOMA does address a
narrow issue in its language-that of same-sex marriage and its
recognition-but such a narrow exception is broad enough to be
characterized as a "general law" because it does not address a particular
case nor is framed with a specific judgment in mind.271 Because of this,
265 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
266 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
267 The court must first satisfy the domicile and public policy requirements of the
conflict-of-laws doctrine before determining it will not recognize another state's marriage.
See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of these requirements. See
infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text for an analysis of these state requirements under
the FFCC.
268 See Whitten, supra note 16, at 389. But see Borchers, supra note 7, at 152 (arguing that a
marriage license does not meet any of the criteria of a judgment and thus is not entitled to
mandatory recognition under the FFCC). Analogously, if a state issued a gun permit, and
the permit holder went to another state with that permit and gun in hand, that state, while
recognizing the permit as proof of receiving a gun permit, is not required to deem the
permit valid and allow the permit holder to proceed with his or her gun into the state
despite contrary laws. Whitten, supra note 16, at 389.
269 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
270 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof").
271 See generally Julie L.B. Johnson, The Meaning of"General Laws": Tlw Extent of Congress's
Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and tHie Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage
Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611 (1997). Some scholars have argued that because Congress only
addressed some types of marriage in the DOMA, rather than marriage in general, DOMA
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federal DOMA survives scrutiny as a "general law" under the second
sentence of the FFCC. Further, DOMA satisfies the language of the
FFCC and is therefore constitutional.
Despite satisfying the language of the FFCC, DOMA still must
mollify one last concern: states' rights. Inherent in the Constitution is a
conflict between federal and state laws. 272  Constitutional concerns
regarding the federal DOMA arises from tension between states' rights
and federal power.273 DOMA might be construed to tread upon those
rights, laying out what the states can and cannot do regarding same-sex
marriage, thus creating an apparent "exception" to the FFCC that limits
states' rights that are fundamentally theirs.274 However, the language of
DOMA states that "No State... shall be required." 275 Such language can
hardly be construed to limit state power. Rather, it affirmatively asserts
the states' right not to recognize same-sex marriage. That right is created
under the public policy exception of the conflict-of-laws doctrine. 276 The
federal DOMA does not abrogate that right; rather, it affirms that the
states that wish to deny recognition to same-sex marriages, whether
under their own DOMAs or under the public policy exception, may do
so.
27 7
Further, the federal DOMA does not directly take away from the
command of enforcement in the first sentence of the FFCC. Rather, it
does not meet the requirements of the FFCC and, consequently, is unconstitutional. Id.; see
also Strasser, supra note 19, at 372.
272 For a discussion of how the FFCC protects states' rights, see supra notes 38-52, and
accompanying text.
273 See Same-Sex Marriage: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Conm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (written statement of Lynn D. Wardle) (stating that federalism
"protects the integrity of the states from possible overreaching by the national government,
while the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects the states from possible overreaching by
each other").
274 See 142 CONG. REC. S5931-01 (1996), cited in Brown, supra note 215, at 165 (statement of
Lawrence H. Tribe, as read into the Record by Senator Ted Kennedy). Specifically, this
exception is a "negative" use of the FFCC, allowing states not to recognize other states' law
despite the FFCC. Allegedly, such a use is unprecedented, and thus, unconstitutional. But
see Brown, supra note 215, at 166-67 (showing as precedent that the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act ("PKPA") was held constitutional in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174
(1988), despite its "negative" use under the FFCC to limit custody decrees to three
jurisdictional bases).
275 28 U.S.C. § 1738(C)(2) (2000). This permissive, rather than mandatory, language
appears to be non-binding and to "offer nothing beyond a 'sense of Congress."' Silverman,
supra note 100, at 1099.
276 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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subtracts from the general implementing statute.278 The federal DOMA
makes an exception to the implementing statute Congress passed
regarding the effect that should be given to judgments.279 Such an
exception is permissible provided it does not undermine the authenticity
of a judgment.280 Congress could have decided to permit states not to
recognize divorce judgments from another state under the FFCC's
implementing statute.281 Rather than addressing divorces however,
Congress, through DOMA, created an exception regarding same-sex
marriages. The federal DOMA not only expressly allocates to the states
the power to recognize or not recognize same-sex marriage; it
intentionally detracted from Congress' power to do so.
By creating the federal DOMA, Congress expressed a willingness to
preserve the same-sex marriage issue for the states. The federal DOMA
was created out of concern that states would feel pressured to recognize
another state's same-sex marriage.282 Because of Congress' DOMA, such
fear was mollified. The federal DOMA permits states to determine for
themselves whether they will recognize same-sex marriages entered into
in another state, while also informing the states that Congress will stay
278 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text. The implementing statute is Title 28
§ 1738 of the United States Code, which states:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of
the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing
the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such
State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or
admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court
annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the
court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738.
279 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, which states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
280 See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
281 Wardle, supra note 49, at 225; see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
282 See supra note 162.
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out of this issue. 283 Further, by permitting states to create their own
statutes governing same-sex marriage, the federal DOMA ensures that
states address the issue of same-sex marriage as a legislative, rather than
a judicial question. For these reasons, the articulation of DOMA is an
important one.
The federal DOMA, then, survives scrutiny under the FFCC. DOMA
falls under the FFCC because DOMA governs public records, namely,
same-sex marriages. 28 DOMA does not, however, deny authentication,
which is impermissible under the FFCC, but rather addresses the
substantive effect of same-sex marriages among the states.285 Nor does
DOMA tread upon states' rights; rather, it allows each state to decide for
itself whether or not it will recognize same-sex marriage. 286 The federal
DOMA provides a balance between federalism and the FFCC, providing
an equilibrium between state and federal government as well as among
states regarding the recognition of same-sex marriage. 287 In light of this,
the federal DOMA satisfies the FFCC requirements. However, while the
federal DOMA may stand constitutionally, whether state DOMAs will
pass constitutional muster is of equal importance and concern. This is
addressed next.
3. State DOMAs and Their Constitutionality
Just as the federal DOMA must survive analysis under the language
of the FFCC and state sovereignty issues implicit in the FFCC, state
DOMAs run into potential federal constitutional problems. 288 For the
states to have constitutionally valid DOMAs, the states must ensure that
283 See Sylvia Law, Access to Justice: 77e Social Responsibility of Lawyers: Families and
Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 175, 216 (2000). Further, DOMA sends a message: that
same-sex marriages are uniquely illegitimate. Id. at 218. However, DOMA also ensures
federalism. Wardle, supra note 161, at 30.
2M See supra text accompanying note 264.
285 See supra note 6.
286 See supra note 6.
287 Wardle, supra note 49, at 221.
m8 Arguably, despite federal DOMA, "states already could refuse to recognize [same-sex]
marriages" under the public policy exception, rendering state DOMAs inherently
constitutional. Strasser, supra note 19, at 370-71. Some scholars, however, argue that the
public policy exception itself is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,
Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997)
(arguing that because the public policy exception permits discrimination against out-of-
state marriages, it is unconstitutional). But see Richard S. Myers, Samne-Sex "Marriage" and
the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45 (1998) (arguing that the public policy
exception applies to each state equally and, as such, is constitutional).
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they do not run afoul of the FFCC. 289 This is especially problematic if the
federal DOMA is determined to be unconstitutional.290 However, if the
federal DOMA is deemed constitutional under the express language of
the FFCC, as is argued above, state DOMAs, which respond to the
federal DOMA, are likely constitutional on those grounds. After all, if
Congress is permitted to limit the extent of FFCC application among the
states, the states should be able to, in turn, respond by implementing that
limitation if they so desire. One constitutional constraint on this
response does, however, exist: the implicit FFCC requirement of
honoring the sovereignty and rights of another state.291
The fundamental FFCC concern that state DOMAs raise is that of
recognizing other states' laws. 292  State DOMAs explicitly deny
recognition of another state's legally recognized same-sex marriage.
293
This denial seems to limit the sovereignty of the state which recognized
the same-sex marriage in the first place. For example, state A's DOMA
impedes on state B's sovereignty because state A will not apply state B's
law, following its DOMA instead. On the other hand, state A should be
able to apply its own law in its own courts. 294 To always require state B's
law to be applied in A's court is to overextend B's sovereignty while at
the same time minimizing A's sovereignty. 295 It was precisely to prevent
this that the FFCC was implemented. 296 The FFCC was created to
prevent situations like the one above, ensuring that state A can apply its
own law. 297 For purposes of state application, the FFCC has been
29 Other constitutional provisions might be problematic as well, such as equal
protection, freedom of speech, and due process. See generally Mark Strasser, Same-Sex
Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and Constitutional Guarantees, 33 LoY.
U. CHI. L.J. 597, 626 (2002).
290 See Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that it would rely on
the federal DOMA as well as Georgia's DOMA to deny recognition to same-sex marriages).
291 See supra text accompanying notes 38-51.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 38-51.
293 See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
2 It is in this way that DOMA protects horizontal federalism (among states) as well as
vertical federalism (between the states and the federal government). Wardle, supra note
161, at 33.
295 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
Concerned with this very issue, Justice Stone stated:
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause,
without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd
result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must
be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.
Id.
29 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
297 See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
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interpreted to imply conflict-of-laws principles. 298 Thus, should DOMA
satisfy the conflict-of-laws doctrine regarding marriage, it will be
constitutional for purposes of state sovereignty under the FFCC.
Under the conflict-of-laws doctrine, states are permitted to apply a
public policy exception to marriage.299 This exception permits state A to
apply state A's marriage law if state B's marriage law violates state A's
public policy. 300 The only limitation to the use of this exception is that it
may only be used in states in which the parties involved are domiciled.301
This is because the state of domicile would have a stronger interest in the
outcome of the case and the parties involved.302 In theory, then, a state is
permitted under the public policy exception to deny recognition of any
marriage that violates that state's public policy, providing that the
parties involved are domiciled within that state.303
DOMA seems to ignore the domicile requirement, permitting states
to not recognize same-sex marriages regardless of domicile connections.
However, while domicile matters for the purposes of the exception, very
few civil unions are between Vermonters. 304 Most come from other
states.305 Thus, this issue, while a valid one, will arise infrequently as
very few couples that receive civil unions are domiciled in Vermont.
Because domicile is unlikely to be an issue for state DOMAs,
DOMAs should be able to function as an expression of the implementing
state's public policy exception. States have applied the public policy
exception to common-law marriages. 3 6 They also have done so for
under-age marriage, polygamy, and incest.30 7 Presumably, the public
policy exception can be applied to same-sex marriages as well. States
may have a significant interest in preserving the traditional view that
29 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 n.1 (1988) (stating that conflicts law is
embodied in the FFCC).
299 See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
300 See supra notes 111-14.
301 See supra text accompanying note 114.
32 See supra text accompanying note 114.
303 See Law, supra note 283, at 217 (showing that "[sltates have always been free to decide
whether a marriage valid in the state in which it was contracted violates a 'strong public
policy' of another state").
3 See supra note 3.
105 See supra note 3.
3 See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
307 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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marriage should be between one man and one woman.3 8 State DOMAs
function as an expression of that interest. Thus, they should be
recognized as a valid use of each state's public policy exception.
State DOMAs, because they are merely declarations of intent to
disregard same-sex marriages under the public policy exception, may
appear on their face to be unnecessary statutes.30 9 The state DOMAs
merely specifically lay out what the courts could conclude, despite the
statute, under the public policy exception.310 However, state DOMAs do
more than just lay out a public policy exception. They preserve each
state's right to decide the same-sex marriage issue, a topic which more
broadly has historically been left to the states, 311 according to the policy
of each state. 312 Just as the federal DOMA permits each state to decide
this issue legislatively, 31 3 states can, through their DOMAs, relegate the
same-sex marriage issue to their legislatures. 314 Rather than leaving this
issue to case-by-case claims, state DOMAs explicitly lay out what their
courts should decide on the issue of same-sex marriage. Further, state
DOMAs ensure notice to all parties who might be interested as to the
outcome of their claim. For these reasons, state DOMAs serve not only
an important and constitutionally permissible function, but protect each
state's autonomy as the FFCC intended.
However, even if the Supreme Court found federal and state
DOMAs to be constitutional, the problem remains whether they can
properly be applied to civil unions, which they do not explicitly address.
It is to this issue that this Note now turns.
B. The Accuracy of the Application of DOMAs to Civil Unions
To date, courts have resisted broadening the language of both the
federal and state DOMAs to include not just same-sex marriages, but
3o8 See Stanley Kurtz, The Coming Battle, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 26, 2002, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtzll2602.asp (stating that "[o]nce marriage
can mean anything, it will mean nothing").
3M See Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and Domestic Relations
Conflicts Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1999).
310 Whitten, supra note 54, at 1247-48.
311 See supra text accompanying note 97.
312 See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
313 See supra text accompanying note 282.
314 Wardle, supra note 161, at 33.
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civil unions.315 The federal DOMA permits recognition of same-sex
relationships that are treated as marriages in the law of the state that
granted recognition of the relationship. 316 While some state DOMAs
broadly deny recognition to any same-sex relationship, most state
DOMAs mirror the federal DOMA's language, denying recognition to
same-sex couples whose relationship is treated as a marriage under state
law.317 In light of this language, the grounds for application of DOMAs
to civil unions are unclear, particularly in light of the Vermont civil
union statute itself.318 Yet, it seems unreasonable to force states to resort
to their courts for evaluation of civil unions when same-sex marriages
are dealt with legislatively. Such a dichotic approach to address two
similar relationships is simultaneously confusing and inconsistent to
citizens as it provides notice regarding state policies as to same-sex
marriage but none regarding civil unions. To address this concern, the
distinction between civil unions and same-sex marriages must be
examined.
Vermont's civil union statute was created as a separate relationship
from that of marriage. 319 Civil unions were created to offer same-sex
couples access to legal benefits. 320  Thus, while civil unions and
marriages enjoy the same benefits under Vermont law, 321 civil unions are
explicitly precluded from Vermont's marriage laws, just as marriages are
precluded from civil union laws.322  Civil unions function under a
315 See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Burns v. Burns,
560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). For a detailed examination of these cases, see supra notes
185-208 and accompanying text. If state DOMAs, with their intent to refuse recognition to
same-sex marriages, were found unconstitutional, even Vermont would have to recognize
same-sex marriages in addition to civil unions. Strasser, supra note 19, at 373. Some
scholars also argue that if same-sex marriages are recognized between states, so civil
unions should also be recognized. Johnson, supra note 3, at 318.
316 See 28 U.S.C, § 1738C (2000).
317 See supra notes 170-71.
318 See supra text accompanying notes 177-81.
319 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
320 See supra text accompanying notes 174-76.
321 For example, the Vermont civil union law includes civil union partners under any
applicable laws containing the word "spouse." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(b) (Supp.
2000). Such a broad integration of civil unions is qualified only where federal law is in
play. Strasser, supra note 19, at 373. Such a limitation was included because Vermont
cannot force the federal government to grant couples in civil unions federal benefits. Id.
Some argue from these factors that "[clivil unions are the legal equivalent to marriage."
Johnson, supra note 3, at 327.
322 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202(2) (2000).
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separate licensing system.323 Civil unions are a local creation, which
lacks the traditional recognition and stability marriage enjoys. This
distinction between civil unions and marriage is further supported by
recent legislative activity to amend Vermont's constitution to deny
recognition to same-sex marriages.324 Such an amendment would not be
proposed if it was thought to upset the already established civil union.
325
Civil unions and marriages are treated as separate entities in Vermont.
Such disparate treatment has not been lost on state courts in recent
cases. 326 In Burns, 32 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that it would
deny the plaintiff her right to visit her son because, as part of the
agreement, she was not allowed to cohabitate, except in the case of
remarriage, and civil unions were not marriages.328  Similarly, in
Rosengarten,329 the Connecticut Appellate Court refused to hear a civil
union dissolution case because the court had jurisdiction over family
relations, under which civil unions, distinct from marriages, did not
fall.330  Both Georgia and Connecticut recognized the distinction
Vermont made between civil unions and marriages and honored it.331
Because Vermont does not treat civil unions as marriages, both
federal and state DOMAs should not be interpreted to include civil
unions. This seems logical; after all, these DOMAs "did not anticipate
the scenario of an alternate form of legally-cognizable relationship"
because civil unions were created after DOMAs. 332 Because DOMAs
include only those relationships treated as marriages, civil unions should
not be implicitly included in their language.
323 Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5131 (requiring a marriage license for those wishing
to have their solemnized marriage legally recognized), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5160
(requiring additionally that a civil union be certified).
324 Ross Sneyd, Senator Wants Amendnent Against Same-Sex Marriage, TIMES ARGUS (Vt.),
Feb. 7, 2003, available at http://timesargus.nybor.com/local/Story/60305.html.
325 Id. The proposal was never intended to effect civil unions, but to address the separate
issue of same-sex marriage. Id.
326 See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Burns v. Burns,
560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). For a detailed examination of these cases, see supra notes
185-208 and accompanying text.
327 560 S.E.2d 47.
328 Id. at 49.
329 802 A.2d 170.
330 Id. at 184.
331 See supra text accompanying note 184.
332 Silverman, supra note 100, at 1102.
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States may decide to use their public policy exception regarding civil
unions the same way they have for marriage. 333 Because state DOMAs
are subject to their state's public policy under the FFCC, 334 states may
avoid recognizing civil unions despite a lack of DOMA if such
recognition violates their public policy.335 The Connecticut Appellate
Court in Rosengarten refused to grant a civil union dissolution precisely
for this reason -pursuant to Connecticut public policy, civil unions were
no more acceptable than were same-sex marriages. 336  This is an
appropriate use of the public policy exception.337
States can deny recognition of civil unions under their public policy
exception because the nature of civil unions is sufficiently similar enough
to other types of relationships that they have denied recognition to
warrant its use.338 Thus, the best public policy argument states could
make would be from analogy. Civil unions can be included under the
public policy exception, just as are polygamy, incest, and common-law
marriage. 339 The latter provides an apt comparison as to how the
argument might look. Common-law marriages were typically not
recognized if sought out explicitly. 340 Civil unions should be similar in
this regard. Because Vermont is the only state that recognizes civil
unions, people travel from all over the nation to enter into them, return
home, and hope for recognition in their domicile state.341 Because these
unions, like common-law marriages, are sought out explicitly, and
333 See supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text. Currently, scholars believe that "if a
state has a strong public policy against same-sex marriage, they won't be forced to
recognize a same-sex marriage from another state." Lawrence Morahan, Civil Rights, Legal
Groups Voice Support of Same-Sex Marriage (Nov. 25, 2002), at http://www.cnsnews.com/
Culture/Archive/200211/CUL20021125c.html. Such a standard should be equally
applicable to civil unions.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 298-99.
335 See Johnson, supra note 3, at 328.
336 Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
337 See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
33 See supra notes 112, 119-22.
339 See supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text. In fact, if civil unions are not, they may
undermine the ability of the states to prohibit these other forms of relationships. Staff
Report, Attorney General Seeks Dismissal of Same-Sex Marriage Suit, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan.
4, 2003, available at http:/ /www.indystar.com/print/articles/3/013357-1053-092.html (on
file with Valparaiso University Law Review). This is precisely the argument Indiana's
Attorney General is making in a current case seeking recognition of a civil union. Id.
340 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961) (finding that a New Jersey
couple that traveled to the District of Columbia for the apparent purpose of entering into a
common law marriage did not have a recognizable marriage in New Jersey because they
were not domiciles of the District of Columbia); supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
341 See supra note 3.
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because they are often not recognized by the domicile state, the domicile
state has an interest in protecting its own state policy and can thus
implement the public policy exception.
Resorting to the public policy exception, while available to states, is
not ideal. It requires the courts to decide these issues on a case-by-case
basis, an approach that is tedious and inefficient. Further, it does not
provide citizens with adequate notice as to the state's position on civil
unions. Additionally, it is uncertain whether the federal DOMA will
yield to the states such power, as it only gives states the power to
address same-sex marriage recognition, not civil unions.342 Fortunately,
a solution exists.
Both the federal and state DOMAs may be revised to include civil
unions, resolving the notice, efficiency, and inconsistency concerns
mentioned above. Because civil unions satisfy the public policy
exception of conflict-of-laws, state DOMAs can be constitutionally
expanded to include civil unions.343 State DOMAs are constitutional
under the FFCC because they satisfy the implicit conflict-of-laws
doctrine of the FFCC.344 Just as same-sex marriage can be validly denied
recognition under state DOMAs because it violates a state's public
policy, so too can civil unions.345 The denial of same-sex marriages is
constitutional because such denial satisfies the public policy exception;
so to do civil unions, which can also be denied recognition under the
public policy exception.346 As a result, states may also, to avoid constant
revision of their DOMAs, include all public policy concerns under the
language of their DOMAs. For example, if states are strongly concerned
not only with recognizing same-sex marriages and civil unions but with
all relationships between same-sex couples, their DOMAs can reflect that
concern. In this manner, states preserve their sovereignty regarding
their laws and policies.
In order for states to amend their statutes, however, the federal
DOMA must be revised as the states derive their power to implement
their DOMAs from the federal DOMA. 347 The federal DOMA can
constitutionally be amended. If Congress has an interest in reserving not
342 See supra text accompanying notes 315-32.
343 See supra text accompanying notes 333-41.
344 See supra text accompanying notes 299-308.
345 See supra text accompanying notes 333-41.
346 See supra text accompanying notes 338-41.
347 See supra text accompanying note 161.
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just same-sex marriage, but also civil union decisions to the states, it
should express that interest through the federal DOMA. Congress can
constitutionally preserve this interest under the FFCC.348 Because civil
unions are issued licenses, they constitute a public record under the
FFCC.349 However, as a public record, a civil union's authenticity is not
undermined by a revised federal DOMA; its validity is.35° Thus, a
certificate of a civil union can serve as evidentiary proof that a civil
union was entered into, while constitutionally being denied recognition
as a civil union.351 State sovereignty is still preserved through this
change, while still honoring the explicit text of the FFCC.352 If Congress
wishes to defer all same-sex couple issues to the states, it may state that
in its DOMA as well. Because both the federal and state DOMAs are
constitutional limitations on the effect of same-sex marriage among the
states under the FFCC, these statutes can be amended to include civil
unions as well.
C. The Consequences of Expanding DOMA to Include Civil Unions
Even if federal and state DOMAs can be constitutionally expanded
to include civil unions, significant ramifications exist as a consequence.
Thus, before both states and Congress consider revising DOMA, they
should be sure that the results are in accord with their intentions.
The ramifications of permitting each state under a DOMA to not
recognize a relationship created and established in another state seems to
lead down a destructive path, not only for those in the relationship, but
for those around them as well. 353 After all, civil unions are similar to
marriage in that they impact many legal areas, such as dividing property
upon a spouse's death, pension rights, and health and insurance
benefits.354  Each state should weigh these issues carefully before
enacting legislation denying recognition of civil unions.
Of course, states cannot control what the federal government does
with civil unions. For example, the fact that the federal DOMA explicitly
denies those in same-sex marriages benefits provided under federal law
348 See supra Part III.A.1-2.
49 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
350 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
351 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
352 See supra text accompanying note 30.
353 See generally Strasser, supra note 19.
354 Hogue, supra note 69, at 41; Whitten, supra note 54, at 1249.
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is not something states can change.355 If Congress changes the federal
DOMA to include civil unions, these benefits will change with it.
However, states can determine what benefits they would like to offer
same-sex partners and, in light of these desires, determine whether to
pass a DOMA that will refuse recognition of civil unions.
First, by not recognizing a civil union, a couple loses legal benefits-
spousal medical and life insurance, for example -that they might have
been entitled to if their civil union had been honored. 35 6 Second, couples
in civil unions cannot file joint tax returns.3 7 Further, a couple who
receives dissolution of their civil union may not be able to enforce their
355 Law, supra note 283, at 218; see 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). Additionally, Congress, when
creating DOMA, included declaratory judgments under the Act in an attempt to ensure
that same-sex partners who decided to seek declaratory judgments regarding their union,
could not evade the reach of DOMA. Whitten, supra note 16, at 391. However, by doing so,
Congress may have inadvertently prohibited more traditional judgments, such as money
judgments in wrongful death actions, from being brought by their same-sex spouses. Id.
But, Congress was intentional in preventing benefits under its federal DOMA by explicitly
stating that same-sex couples in a marriage-like relationship would not be eligible for
federal benefits. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2002). It seems unlikely that that DOMA bars any claim
that could be brought "but for" the marriage. Borchers, supra note 7, at 181. It could be
reasonably argued that loss of consortium does not arise out of marriage but arises out of
the negligence of another. Id. Further, the "arising out of" language in DOMA might be
understood as applying to choice-of-law, not judgment recognition. Id. Thus, it might be
construed to relate to which state's law applies, not whether a claim can be made. Id. at
182.
356 See Domestic Relations - Same-Sex Couples - Vermont Creates System of Civil Unions - Act
Relating to Civil Unions, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1421, 1422-23 (2001). Vermont's civil unions are
granted "all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law.., as are granted
to spouses in a marriage." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2000). However, these
similarities end where federal law is in any way applicable. Domestic Relations, supra, at
1423. Specifically, the federal DOMA defines "marriage" as between one man and one
woman. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). Thus, federal benefits are not available to same-sex couples
unless the federal DOMA is found unconstitutional or repealed. Strasser, supra note 19, at
364. Some states, however, are willing to grant same-sex couples benefits even if they are
unwilling to recognize same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Mark Worrall, Cal to Consider Sweeping
Domestic Partner Bill (Jan. 27, 2003), at http://www.365gay.com/NewsContent/012703cal
Partners.htm (on file with Valparaiso University Law Review) (explaining California's
recent plans to offer same-sex couples benefits); Ed Sealover, Same-Sex Partners Get City
Benefits, THE GAZETTE (Colo.), Feb. 6, 2003, available at http://www.gazette.com/display.
php?sid=83376 (on file with Valparaiso University Law Review) (discussing Colorado
Springs' plan to give same-sex partners healthcare benefits). New Jersey has had a recent
bill introduced that would give same-sex couples the same benefits as married couples
under New Jersey law. Reginald Roberts, Their Goal: Same-Sex Unions (Jan. 23, 2003),
available at http://www.nj.com/news/ ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news-3/104330598
424810.xml (on file with Valparaiso University Law Review).
357 Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1997).
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property division judgment if they are in another state because DOMA
seems to permit states to refuse to enforce this type of judgment as
well.358 Additionally, if a couple joined by a civil union had a child,
adopted or by some other means, denying that relationship might
adversely affect that child.359 Finally, by not recognizing the lawful
union of the parents, a child may be rendered illegitimate.360
Civil unions are already fundamentally disadvantaged because they
are less portable than marriages. 361 However, states should remember
that, under Vermont law, those in civil unions are entitled to the rights
and benefits listed above. 362 Civil union couples receive other benefits as
well, such as the right to receive maintenance and support from their
partners; judicial intervention and remedy regarding division of
property, child custody, and spousal abuse; inherit; bring wrongful
death suits; joint parenting; joint adoption; receive worker's
compensation as a family; spousal immunity from testifying; and
equality under local and state tax laws. 363 Whether or not another state
will decide to honor those benefits hinges on whether that state will
recognize the civil union entered into. States should consider carefully
whether they intended to deny recognition of civil unions under their
DOMAs or as a public policy exception because the implications of
denying a same-sex couple recognition of their union are many.
However, each state should be aware that it is their decision. Under the
FFCC, each state is entitled to determine, based upon its public policies,
whether it wants to recognize civil unions and, if not, whether to leave
the issue to its courts under the public policy exception, or to its
legislature through DOMA.
IV. MODEL FEDERAL AND STATE DOMAs
It seems that while Julie and Cassandra would succeed in having
their civil union found inapplicable under both the federal and Georgia
DOMAs, such a success might be limited. If Congress and the state of
Georgia amend their DOMAs to include civil unions, Julie and
Cassandra have no recourse under the FFCC.
358 Strasser, supra note 19, at 371-72.
359 Id.
360 Kelly, supra note 33, at 211-12.
361 Eskridge, supra note 135, at 862.
362 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1240(a) (2000).
363 Eskridge, supra note 135, at 866.
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This Part proposes what such an amendment would look like. First,
this Part suggests revisions to the current federal DOMA. Then, this Part
offers changes to those state DOMAs that currently only apply to same-
sex marriages.
A. A Model Revision of the Federal DOMA
Although it is constitutional for Congress to limit the effects of civil
unions among states, Congress cannot do so under its federal DOMA as
it currently stands. Specifically, the plain language of this statute does
not apply to civil unions, which are fundamentally different from same-
sex marriages.364 Consequently, Congress may redraft its DOMA if it
wishes to allow states to address this issue. Specifically, the federal
DOMA should be rewritten as follows:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a marriage or
civil union between persons of the same sex under the
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or
a right or claim arising from such relationship. 365
If Congress wishes to have the states handle all same-sex
relationships, it should include that in its revision. Such a revision is
preferable as it ensures that states do not circumvent the law by creating
a different type of same-sex relationship treated differently than
marriage under their laws.366 Such a revision might look like the
following:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory, possession, or tribe respecting any conjugal
relationship between persons of the same sex contracted
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession,
364 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
365 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (italicized words added).
366 This is precisely what happened with Vermont's civil union. See supra Part II.C.3.
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or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.367
Commentary: By making either of these changes under the language
of the federal DOMA, Congress preserves the recognition of civil unions,
as it did with same-sex marriages, for the states, honoring the implied
state sovereignty found in the FFCC.368 Because states have traditionally
reserved marriage and its aberrations to the states, permitting them to
determine the nature and extent of credit they will give to other states,
Congress should extend the civil unions issue to the states as well. 36
9
Congress has already demonstrated that it is willing to allow states to
address the issue of same-sex marriage.370 Reserving the same power
regarding civil unions for the states would be consistent with such
willingness. Congress would be appropriately deferring to the states
and their sovereignty on this issue.
Further, by implementing this change, Congress ensures that its
meaning and purpose for the statute is clear. Congress facilitates
efficiency in the federal DOMA's application as courts are enabled to
apply it based upon the plain language of the statute itself. States will
have a clear statement as to the extent of their power under the federal
DOMA, and will be able to act according to their public policy on this
issue.
B. Model State DOMA Amendments
In states where recognition of civil unions contravenes their public
policy, DOMA may explicitly reflect that policy for it to be included
under their DOMA provided that the federal DOMA permits them to do
so. 37 ' Though the public policy exception permits the states to deny
recognition to civil unions if they so chose, the states may revise their
statutes to provide a clear statement as to the will of the people and to
promote efficiency in and clarity for the courts. As such, each state may
constitutionally include civil unions specifically in their DOMAs,
provided such an inclusion reflects public policy concerns in their
respective state. Thus, states that wish to refuse to recognize a civil
367 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (italicized words added).
W6 See supra text accompanying notes 38-51.
369 See supra text accompanying note 97.
370 See supra text accompanying note 161-63.
371 See supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text.
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union validly granted elsewhere might reword their state DOMAs to
state:
The State of [state name] shall not recognize as valid any
marriage of or civil unions between parties of the same sex
that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result
of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a
marriage license or civil union license was issued.372
Other states which intended to include civil unions under their
DOMAs when they denied not only recognition but also rights arising
out of such relationships may redraft their DOMAs to read as follows:
Any marriage or civil union entered into by persons of
the same sex, where a marriage or civil union license is
issued by another state or a foreign jurisdiction, shall be
void in [state name] and any contractual or other rights
granted by virtue of that license, including its
termination, shall be unenforceable in the [state name]
courts.
3 73
In states with strong public policy concerns that extend broader than
just same-sex marriage or civil unions to include other legally recognized
same-sex relationships, DOMA may be revised to include this concern,
stating that interest as follows:
The State of [state name] shall not recognize as valid any
legally contracted conjugal relationship between parties of
the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have
occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction
regardless of whether a license was issued. 374
Finally, those states that have DOMAs which more broadly refuse to
recognize same-sex relationships and further deny any rights of such
relationships need not redraft their statute as they implicitly include civil
372 Cf. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (1975) (italicized words added). States who might adopt
this revised statute include Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Idaho, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington. See supra note 170.
373 Cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(c) (Michie 1998) (italicized words added). States who
might like to adopt this version of DOMA include Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, and Virginia. See supra note 171.
374 Cf. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (italicized words added).
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unions and other same-sex relationships under their DOMA's
language.375
Commentary: Either revision to include civil unions or, more broadly,
legally contracted relationships between same-sex couples ensures that
state DOMAs accurately reflect all of the public policy concerns of their
state while also guaranteeing that its citizens are notified of that concern.
If such concerns are not reflective of its citizenry, states' residents may
indicate this to their legislature. As a consequence, case-by-case
decisions are avoided and the people's will on this issue is effectively
followed.
A state might revise its DOMA to ensure that its own sovereignty is
honored within its own state, guaranteeing that its own laws will apply
to its citizens, who created such laws.376  Particularly on this
controversial issue, states may establish their own laws governing this
issue based upon their public policies without worrying about the
constitutionality of such laws under the FFCC, provided the federal
DOMA extends power to the states to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
Julie and Cassandra may have won a victory, but that victory will
likely be temporary. It is likely that their attempt to circumvent the law
of their home state in an effort to be legally recognized as a couple will
ultimately be in vain.377 The federal and state DOMAs that Georgia
adheres to are constitutional under Article IV, Section 1. 37 8
This Note asserts that while both federal and state DOMAs are
constitutional under the FFCC, the application of DOMA to civil unions
is not permissible. Under a historical interpretation of the FFCC,
Congress has the power to declare the substantive effect that any
375 These states include Alaska, Florida, and Virginia. See supra note 172.
376 See supra text accompanying notes 38-51.
377 A more valuable and effective approach would be to go through the state legislature
itself, as it has the power to control the recognition of civil unions that a same-sex couple
would desire. Wardle, supra note 161, at 31. However, even this resort may not be
available as consideration is currently beginning for a Federal Marriage Amendment,
though its success seems nominal. See Dennis Teti, The Federal Marriage Amendment Is
Hopeless (Nov. 19, 2003), at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/
000/000/003/395zmzjc.asp.
378 Other avenues might be pursued, such as equal protection, due process, and freedom
of expression violations. See supra note 219.
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judgment, including marriage and civil unions, may have among states.
Similarly, states are free to disregard same-sex marriages and civil
unions granted in other states provided that Congress has permitted
them to do so and that such disregard satisfies the state's public policy
exception.
The language of the federal DOMA, as well as many state DOMAs,
clearly is limited to same-sex marriages. Because civil unions are not
same-sex marriages, these statutes should not be applied to civil unions.
However, states may use their public policy exception to determine
whether civil unions are recognized in their state.
If Congress and the states wish to apply DOMA to civil unions after
considering the ramifications of denying civil unions recognition, they
must revise their DOMAs to include civil unions. To do so would
promote efficiency and clarity for the courts and relegate this issue to the
state legislatures.
Anita Y. Woudenberg*
The author dedicates this Note to her husband, Nathan, out of gratitude for his
support and patience throughout the writing process. May the discussions sparked by this
Note be as meaningful and thought-provoking as his have been. SDG
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